

The Difficult Relationship Between Haiti and the Dominican Republic

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Table of contents

Chapter I: Introduction.....	3
Chapter II: Historical Context: 1697 to 1930.....	13
Chapter III: Haitian and Dominican Leaders: 1930 to the Present.....	23
Chapter IV: Societal Influences Shaping Haitian and Dominican Foreign Policy.....	43
Chapter V: External Factors Shaping Haitian-- Dominican Relations.....	54
Chapter VI Conclusion	66
References.....	82

Introduction

Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two countries that have been plagued with conflicts, high levels of poverty, political problems, human rights violations, and failures of political leadership. The real reasons why the relationships between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been so turbulent have been ignored by Haitian scholars, Dominican scholars and politicians from both parts of the island as well. My thesis intends to examine the question: *Why have Haiti and the Dominican Republic had such a discordant relationship throughout their history?* This thesis will attempt to answer this question using the vehicle of foreign policy.

Broadly, the study of foreign policy is dedicated to the understanding and explaining of the behavior of significant actors in the international system (Neak et al., 1995). Foreign policy analysis is an investigative process, which primarily examines the responses of international units, (usually states), to their external environment, that is, beyond their physical borders.

According to Deborah J. Gerner, “The central focus of foreign policy analysis is on the intentions, statements and actions of actors towards the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions” (Gerner, 1995). For Gerner, a defining factor of the study of foreign policy is its focus on both the international and domestic spheres and the need to move between individual, state, and systemic levels of analysis (Gerner, 1995).

Foreign policy is therefore studied from a variety of perspectives. It may entail the analysis of various actors such as the state, non-state entities and sub-state entities; a range of levels, including the individual-level, state-level and the systemic-level; different milieus such as the internal and external, and variables, that include discourse, strategies, policies and actions. All

these components are essential to properly analyze the Haitian / Dominican conflict, looking at the problem through the framework of foreign policy.

The politics of foreign policy are perpetually changing, depending on the country or the region, and by no means always in the same directions (Hill 2003, P. 11). This is why *the system level of analysis* is so important when it is used to analyze the discordance between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. At the system level of analysis, the primary purpose is to use this level to get “outside” of national borders in order to discuss the interactions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic with other states and transnational actors, and with international organizations that have helped shape the foreign policy of both countries. The analysis begins with the view that countries and other international actors operate in a global social-economic, political-geographic environment and that the specific characteristics of the system help determine the pattern of interaction among actors (Neack 2003. P. 125).

Haiti and the Dominican Republic are nations living side by side yet worlds apart. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two nations trapped by historical circumstances on a small Caribbean island. Yet, it is a rare case, indeed, when events on one part of the island do not have an eventual impact on the other side. There is no escape from this reality; and that is why relations between Haiti and The Dominican Republic have been more a matter of fear and mistrust rather than a cordial friendship.

Throughout the history of the island (*la Hispaniola*) there has been a long struggle in which the western part tried to take over the eastern part. The French colonists encroached on the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo, and latter, Haiti tried to absorb the Dominican Republic. Because of this, Dominicans traditionally view Haitians as a threat. For decades this point of

view has been promoted by Dominican politicians and accentuated by the thirty-one year dictatorship of Rafael L. Trujillo. He stressed the differences between Haitians and Dominicans, rather than their commonality. The dictator implied that Haitians were inferior human being, and less than Dominicans. Whole generations of Dominican leaders, as well as common folks, were raised under this ideology. As a result, even today most Dominicans share the belief of this historical myth that has made the international relations between the two countries extremely difficult.

Statement of the Problem

The sources of the discords between Haiti and the Dominican Republic are diverse, requiring multicausal explanations to be drawn from a variety of fields. It is important to unravel both the ambiguities of the past and the antipathies of the turbulent present to get to the sources of the problem. Haiti is an important variable in the Dominican Republic's security equation. Hispaniola is the only island in the world encompassing two entirely independent nations. The island Christopher Columbus called "la Hispaniola" was first divided, in 1697, by France and Spain into two ill-fitting pieces. This split generated anger that still remains virulently alive to the Haitians and Dominicans who inhabit it today. United by geography and ecology, the two sides of the island are separated by diverse, divergent histories, a background of wars, occupations, and genocide. In addition to racial, linguistic, and cultural differences, the flare-ups of mutual suspicion and antipathy, there are striking differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in regards to environmental conditions and levels of development.

Even today, these grave problems divide the two countries. On the Dominican side, openly racist expressions of hostility toward Haitians abound. Haitian immigrants have been victimized and denied basic rights; including due process in deportation proceeding and citizenship for those born in the Dominican Republic (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Perhaps even more important, people of both nationalities, (especially many Dominicans), believe themselves to be utterly different from, and incompatible with their neighbors from across the island. Acceptance of this idea generates unwarranted negativity and provides leaders on either side of the island with a ready-made rationale for not trying harder to improve relations with their island neighbors (Martinez, 2003). The conflict has important negative consequences for the Dominican Republic's standing in the world. The allegation that Dominicans are implacably hostile to all things Haitian is tarnishing the Dominican Republic's image in international circles, particularly when it is alleged that Haitian migrant workers are enslaved on Dominican sugar plantations (Haiti Support Network, Nov. 9, 2000).

Because the study of the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic has been neglected by scholars in the arena of international relations, these issues that have created such deep resentment between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been passed down to politicians and members of the societies of both countries for two centuries. Only cursory attention has been paid to the forces that have divided them. Anti-Haitian feelings, mistrust, and ideas of incompatibility held by Dominicans have created discrimination against Haitians in regards to immigration practices. Therefore, migration-related tension is a central part of the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. There has been insufficient research as to why and when those issues emerged, making the relationship between both countries

irreconcilable. This study seeks to identify the possible cause of the tensions and the persistent intolerances that exist in the relations between the two countries.

Literature Review

Three U.S. writers were largely responsible for bringing the level of analysis approach into mainstream of international relations theory, they are: Kenneth N. Waltz, Morton A. Kaplan and J. David Singer (Hollis et. al., 1990, P. 97-100). The level of analysis approach allows analysts to identify the location in which sources of explanation for observed phenomena can be found. (Buzan, 1995. P.199).

Three levels of analysis will offer a better understanding of the discordant situation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Examining issues at different levels of analysis is a standard approach in international relations because it fits into the discipline's subject matter in terms of individuals, states and systems.

The issue of levels of analysis came into International Relations during the 1950s, as part of the broader impact on the behavioral movement, which was trying to introduce the methodology and rigor of the natural sciences into social science. The main concern was to encourage a more positive, scientific approach into the discipline, by stressing observed facts, quantitative measurements, hypothesis-testing, and the development of cumulative theory. The term "levels" does suggest a range of spatial scales or "heights." In this sense, levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located (Buzan, 1995.P. 205).

Although there are various categorizing levels that may be utilized, international relations scholars have typically relied on three primary levels: the individual, the nation-state,

and the system. The individual level is the smallest or micro level of measurement, where causality is traced to the individuals who make foreign policy and the psychology of human decision-making (Waltz, 1960). At the most disaggregated level of analysis we have individual decision-makers. The individual level of analysis focuses on the ways the education, experience, socialization, personality traits, or physical health, of a policymaker differs from that of other individuals who have held or might have held the position in the past. Explanations at this level most reveal differences in the characteristics of decision makers to discern the differences in the decisions they make. For example, what can be discovered by contrasting Jean Bertrand Aristide's personal traits and inexperience in foreign policy with that of an experienced leader such as Joaquin Balaguer?

J. David Singer, writing on the "levels of analysis" approach, discussed the remaining two broader levels, the state and the system. The nation/state level is a middle level and involves the examination of government structures, bureaucratic politics, interest groups, media influences, and other internal factors that might influence or account for a nation/state's foreign policy behavior. The systemic level is the most inclusive level of research in foreign policy. It involves not only the investigation of state-to-state relations but also environmental or structural factors, such as geography, relative power, or capitalist interdependence; anything that might influence or affect the behavior of all nation/states.

The idea of levels-of-analysis has had a profound impact in my analysis of the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This approach is central to international relations theory and provides a potent way of dividing up the vast and complex subject matter of international relations. It has allowed me to analyze these complicated relations between both

countries in far more detail.

Research Questions

1. What roles have Dominican and Haitian leaders played shaping the international relationship of each country?
2. How have societal influences shaped Haitian and Dominican relations?
3. How have external factors such as the foreign policy of the United States, IGOs, and other states such as France, and Canada, affected the Caribbean; most specifically the relationships between the Dominican Republic and Haiti?

Methodology

I intend to use a qualitative approach to answer my research questions. The study presented in this paper is descriptive and analytical. That is, it provides a case study of what has happened in real world situations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Case studies offer a detailed picture of a particular complex condition and this method allows the researchers to hypothesize as to why certain events took place and thus what variables should be considered in future research. A case study can take on many forms such as exploratory, analytical, descriptive, or deliberative. However, a case study may also consist of a combination of any of the basic forms. The descriptive case study provides an account of the process and/or records action or sequence of actions. The analytical case study looks at results as well as the process. A deliberative case is concerned with the process, but it is also concerned with the manner in which transformations within the particular situation take place. For data collection, I will rely heavily upon secondary sources for analysis such as scholarly articles, books, and archival records.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is that it contributes valuable insight into Haiti and the Dominican Republic's foreign policies. There is a great need for the systematic research on the relations between the two countries, especially because of the ability of the research to help improve the function of the governments, and because the citizens of both countries have been seeking a long lasting solution to the myriad problems that have been affecting the international relations of the two countries for decades. The results of this study may be utilized to develop improved methods, and to implement strategies to promote courses of action intended to find these solutions. Though Haitian and Dominican ideologies continue to be incompatible, they can nevertheless adopt a practical and peace-preserving foreign policy.

Organization of the Study

The research is presented in five chapters. Chapter I provides brief background information for both nations, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, theoretical framework, research questions, review of the theoretical literature, methodology, significance of the study, and organization of the study.

Chapter II provides historical factors, from 1697 to 1930, that contributed to the difficult relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are two nations trapped by historical circumstances on a small Caribbean island. The history of the island has been perceived as a long struggle, in which the West tries to take over the East. Until the official recognition of the French colony of Saint-Domingue, the French and the Spanish lived on the brink of war (Sagas, 1994). The French constantly pushed their unofficial borders in their

need for land, while the Spanish carried on punitive raids in a futile effort to eradicate the French presence in Hispaniola.

Chapter III focuses on how leaders shape international relationships to investigate the role these individuals played at different historical times that affected, in one way or another, the relationship of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This analysis is extremely important because both Haitian and Dominican leaders define the states' international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, leaders build expectations, plan strategies, and urge governments to take action based on their judgments about what is possible, and what would most likely help them maintain their positions. Such perceptions help frame governments' orientations in international affairs. Leaders' interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context (Hermann 1988, P. 124-37). This chapter will be divided into three case studies: A) Rafael L. Trujillo and Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier: B) Juan Bosch, Joaquin Balaguer, Jean Bertrand Aristide, and C) Rene Preval and Leonel Fernandez.

Chapter IV will examine societal influences on foreign policy. As such, the chapter will focus on the clash of culture, nationalism, and ethnic conflict between Haitians and Dominicans. All of these societal influences deeply affect the relationship between both countries.

Chapter V will examine how external factors influence foreign policy. The primary purpose of the analysis at this level is to step outside national borders in order to analyze the interactions of states with other states and with transnational actors, within international organizations. In this study, I will analyze how external factors, such as the United States foreign policy in the Caribbean area, affects the relationships between Haiti and the Dominican

Republic. Where the Dominican Republic and Haiti are concerned, the United States is not just a spectator. The stakes are high, what happens in these countries affects the United States, in material and more subtle ways. The geographical position of Haiti could affect United States commerce and shipping in case of war. In other words, every ship sailing from New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, Baltimore, Newport News or the eastern coast of North America (including Canada) is compelled to pass by the island of the Hispaniola, either through the Windward (Haitian side) or Mona Passage (Dominican side). Travel to the greater part of Europe would use the Mona Passage by the East Coast of the island. In addition, is the fact that the United States is economically invested in the Dominican Republic. The U.S. relationship with the island has helped shape the conditions that now exist in both nations. These actions have resulted in violence and political instability in both countries, and thus the stream of immigrants heading to the United States' shores today. United States has invaded each country twice this century (Haiti in 1915 and 1994; Santo Domingo in 1916 and 1965). Chapter VI will be the conclusion. It will offer my findings as to why the relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic are so conflictive.

Chapter II: Historical Context: 1697-1930.

Cultural differences may be at the root of the centuries-old, Haitian/Dominican conflict. The fact is that the two countries barely coexist on this small divided island, and conflicts arise almost every day between the two countries. How did the island, the Tainos called *Quisqueya*, come to be divided into two countries, and inhabited by two peoples of such different cultures? A look at the colonial past of Haiti and the Dominican Republic contains the answer to this question. Both countries have a colonial background that has made them into what they are today. By 1655, France won western Hispaniola from Spain, through it did not wrest a formal concession until the 1697 when the Treaty of Ryswick sealed the truce in the Nine Year's War in Europe. That split Hispaniola into two colonies, the much larger Spanish Santo Domingo and the smaller French Saint-Domingue (Wucker 1999, P.32). The division of the island into Haiti and the Dominican Republic is a perfect example of how colonialism and the plantation system shaped the geography, demography and psychology of the new world, shaping it in ways that eventually led to perpetual friction, including the Haitian/Dominican conflict of today. Part of the answer as to why their futures unfolded differently involves environmental differences. Compared to the Dominican Republic, the area of flat land good for agriculture in Haiti is much smaller, as a higher percentage of Haiti's area is mountainous. There is more limestone terrain, and the soil is thinner and less fertile and has a lower capacity for recovery.

Although the Haitian side of the island was less endowed environmentally it developed a rich agricultural economy before the Dominican side, and became the most valuable colony of France's overseas empire. Santo Domingo was a colony of Spain. In the late 1500s Spain began neglecting Hispaniola because it was in economic and political decline itself (Diamond, 2005).

Santo Domingo was a small colony with little supportive impact on the economy of Spain. Even though, by the end of the eighteenth century, economic conditions were improving, landowners in Santo Domingo still did not enjoy the same level of wealth attained by their French counterparts in Saint-Domingue. The absence of market-driven pressure to increase production led the domestic labor force to produce less and to export at low levels. For this reason, Santo Domingo had less of a need for additional labor forces so it imported far fewer slaves than did Saint-Domingue. In addition, this also contributed to the separate paths of the countries. Spanish law allowed a slave to purchase his freedom and that of his family for a relatively small sum. This contributed to the higher proportion of freedmen in the Spanish colony. By the turn of the eighteenth century, freedmen actually constituted the majority of the population. Also in contrast to conditions in the French colony, this population profile contributed to a somewhat more egalitarian society that was plagued much less by the schisms of race. When the Haitian Revolution broke out in 1791, thousands of White people fled the colony both during and after the revolt to escape the wrath of their slaves. The revolution freed the Haitian blacks from their slavery, but class structures based on race did not disappear with the flight of the French. Those few remaining whites were massacred by Dessalines in 1805 to protect the revolution. As a consequence, Haiti was a nation with a large Black majority and a relatively small number of mulattos.

In contrast, France was able to invest in developing intensive, slave-based, plantation agriculture in Saint-Domingue. France imported far more slaves into its colony than did Spain. The Spanish could not, or chose not to, develop their side of the island. Because France had the funds and manpower they enjoyed an economic boom. This economic boom would not last long

without the financial support of the French. After Haiti's independence in 1804, its burst of agricultural wealth came at the expense of its environment. It sold off its trees, and this eroded their soil (Diamond, 2005).

Haiti had a population that was seven times greater than its neighbor during colonial times, and it still has a somewhat larger population today, but Haiti's area is only slightly more than half of that of the Dominican Republic. As a result, Haiti, with a larger population and smaller area, has double the Republic's population density with less land mass and less fertile soil to use for economic development. This eventually contributed to harming the Haitian economy while the Dominican economy remained stable.

The colonies were as different topographically as they were in terms of language and European ties. The different political and social conditions in both countries would create sharply different economies, which in turn shaped race relations. The result was that the free European and the enslaved African populations remained separate in Saint-Domingue but mixed in Santo Domingo.

With the advent of Haitian independence, and with their people trapped and fighting for limited territory, the confrontations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic became frequent in the 19th century. Thus, there was a larger racial schism in Haiti. The Haitian slaves couldn't buy their freedom, so the slaves of Saint-Domingue rebelled, led by a former slave named Toussaint Louverture. He fought until 1798, when he broke the foreign hold on that part of the island out of Hispaniola. In 1801, Toussaint's army invaded Santo Domingo in hopes of unifying the island and abolishing slavery in the eastern Spanish End. But later that year, France betrayed him when he tried to negotiate independence for the colony under his control. With the

help of the former slave, Henri Christophe, the French sent a chained Toussaint away from Saint-Domingue to die in a mountain prison in France (Wucker 1999. P. 37). After Louverture's death, the French returned to Haiti, but they were unable to retake the former French colony, they invaded Santo Domingo. The eastern part of the island remained under French control for eight years.

Meanwhile the Haitians continued to fight, and in 1804 the victorious former slaves established Haiti, the first free black independent nation in the America. Jean Jacques Dessalines, the general who declared Haiti's victory over the French became the new nation's first emperor (Jacques I). From the very day that Haiti became independent, January 1, 1804, its leaders believed that in order for Haiti to remain independent, the entire island must be unified under Haitian rule. Henceforth Haiti's policy toward Santo Domingo would be directed by this belief. Haitian leadership wrote a clause into the first Haitian constitution that the island was indivisible (Lancer, July 2007). In 1825, troops under Dessalines tried to take Spanish Santo Domingo but failed and retreated. But in the 1820, under the leadership of Jean Pierre Boyer, Toussaint's dream of one undivided island nation was revived.

In November 1821, the Dominicans declared their independence from Spain, and President Jose Nunez de Caceres aspired to attach Santo Domingo to Bolivar's Colombian Federation. Boyer, however, realized that Haiti's chances for continued freedom depended on securing Spanish Hispaniola (Moya Pons, 1972: 22-23). Because of this, Boyer planted another idea in minds of the governors of the outlying Dominican states. He argued that "Joining Haiti was the only way to ensure that Spain would not take over Santo Domingo." With the governors' support, Boyer went to Nunez de Caceres and "offered" to send twelve thousand troops to defend

the island (Franco 1993. P. 176-177; Moya Pons 1972 P. 34). On February 9, 1822, the Dominicans met Boyer and his troops. Boyer's first act was to declare an end to slavery across the island. After gaining control of Santo Domingo and declaring an end to slavery, Boyer then took over Santo Domingo and its people wanting to unify the whole island, but under the Haitian control. After that, the friendly relations between both countries changed forever.

Santo Domingo was not only the Haitians' protection against invasion from the European powers, but also a cash box holding part of the ransom for Haitian independence. In 1825, desperate to regain access to European markets, Boyer agreed to pay France an indemnity as restitution for property lost by the colonists during the Haitian Revolution. Incredible as it was the Haitian victors had to compensate the *loser* in their war for independence; the 150 million Francs agreed upon was more amazing. Under Boyer's plan, Dominicans' sweat would raise the funds to pay the debt (Wucker 1999. P. 39). In the twenty two years of Haitian occupation, the Dominican Republic witnessed a steady economic decline and growing resentment toward Haiti among Dominicans. The agricultural pattern in the former Spanish colony came to resemble the one prevailing in all Haiti, which at that time had little or no agricultural production for export. Increasing numbers of Dominican landowners chose to flee the island rather than to live under Haitian rule. In many cases, Haitian administrators encouraged such emigration, confiscated the holdings of the *émigrés*, and redistributed them to Haitian officials. Aside from such bureaucratic machinations, most of the Dominicans' resentment of Haitian rule developed because Boyer, the ruler of an impoverished country, did not or could not supply provisions for his army. The occupying Haitian forces lived off the land in Santo Domingo, commandeering or confiscating what they needed to perform their duties or to fill their stomachs. Dominicans saw this as tribute

demanded by petty conquerors, who were seen as thieves.

Racial animosities affected attitudes on both sides. Black Haitian troops reacted with reflexive resentment against lighter-skinned Dominicans, while Dominicans came to associate the Haitians' dark skin with the oppression and the abuses of occupation. Religious and cultural life also suffered under the Haitian occupation. The Haitians, who associated the Roman Catholic Church with the French colonists who had exploited and abused them before independence, confiscated all church property in the east, deported all foreign clergy, and severed the ties of the remaining clergy to the Vatican. For Dominicans, who were much more strongly Roman Catholic and less oriented toward folk religion, such actions seemed insulting and nihilistic (Franco 1993. P. 182-184). In addition, upper class Haitians considered French culture superior to Spanish culture, while Haitians soldiers and others from the lower class simply disregarded Hispanic mores and customs.

The emigration of upper-class Dominicans served to prevent rebellion and to prolong the period of Haitian occupation because most Dominicans looked to the upper class for leadership. Scattered unrest and isolated confrontations between Haitians and Dominican undoubtedly occurred, however, it was not until 1838 that any significant organized movement against Haitian domination began. Crucial to these stirrings was discontent of the Haitian people and Juan Pablo Duarte, a twenty-year-old Dominican, of a prominent Santo Domingo family, who had returned home after seven years of study in Europe. Although the Haitian people were no longer slaves, all was not well in the country. The Haitian people were angry because the economy had collapsed not only in Haiti but on the whole island. This led to Boyer's downfall. The overthrow of Boyer in the Revolution of 1843 provided a catalyst for Duarte and the

Dominican rebels. Charles Riviere-Herard replaced Boyer as president of Haiti. Like most Haitian leaders, he required a transition period in which to deal with competitors and to solidify his rule, thus the governing body was unstable.

By February 1844, the Dominican rebels, under the leaderships of Francisco del Rosario Sanchez and Ramon Matia Mella, took advantage of the unstable internal situation in Haiti and declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. On February 27, 1844 (thereafter celebrated as Dominican Independence Day); the Haitian garrison in Santo Domingo, taken by surprise and apparently betrayed by at least one of its sentries, retired in disarray. Within two days, all Haitian officials had left Santo Domingo (Franco 1977. P, 161; Moya Pons 1974. P. 21) Unlike Haiti and other countries of Latin America, the Dominican Republic does not celebrate the anniversaries of independence from a European colonial power. Every February 27, it reminds itself that it fought off its neighbor, Haiti, to become an independent nation.

The declaration of Dominican independence was a rather peaceful event, but the achievement of independence was not, for Haitian leaders not only considered the East as a part of Haiti, but also as vital to the security and economic welfare of the Haitian state. Between 1844—1856, different Haitian leaders tried unsuccessfully to re-annex the East. These protracted wars fostered an anti-Haitian sentiment among the Dominican population, a feeling that was nurtured by the dominant elites in order to reinforce nationalism (Sagas, 2000). These Haitian-Dominican wars drove Dominican leaders to seek the protection of foreign powers. Their main concern was that the Dominican Republic had a smaller population than Haiti, and it was possible that the Dominican Republic could not hold its own as an independent nation.

In 1859, General Pedro Santana, who had established military rule in Santo Domingo,

began negotiations with Spain in the hopes that it might protect its former colony from Haitian harassment. By March 1861, Dominicans were again Spanish subjects at their own request. Almost immediately, however, the new Spanish administrators, shocked by the dark skin of their new citizens, began to exclude Dominicans from the army, government, and social positions in their own land. Adding insult to injury, they refused to exchange Dominican money at face value; seized livestock and goods imposed new rules on the local clergy, and hampered trade that was not with Spain (Wucker 1999. P. 42). Haiti's President, Fabre Nicolas Geffrard, anxious to rid Hispaniola of the Spanish presence, gave the Dominican rebels arms and shelter. Geffrard had made it clear that unless Santo Domingo was independent, Haiti could not consider itself free of threats to its own sovereignty. Ironically, among the Dominican exiles who received help from Haiti were Francisco del Rosario Sanchez, one of the Trinitarios who had fought for Dominican independence from Haiti in 1844. For two years, from 1863 to 1865 the island was consumed by warfare, as the Haitian-supported rebels battled the Spanish occupiers. Ultimately, Spain had no chance at winning the island, which in any case, had already proved to be more trouble than it was worth. On March 3, 1865, defeated Spain ended its re-annexation of Santo Domingo (Wucker 1999. P. 43).

Between 1874 and 1912, no fewer than eight efforts failed to define where Dominican territory stopped and Haitian territory began. By 1916, the point was moot, because both countries were again occupied by foreign power. This time it was no longer a European power that claimed domination over the former colonies; it was the United States. Hispaniola had become one more place where the Americans proved that they, not the Europeans, were the power in the hemisphere.

Because the Dominican nation had its own functioning government, in 1924, the United States' Marines prepared to leave the Republic, but U.S. Marines were still stationed in Haiti. While Marines were still in Haiti, the United States' military strategists realized that an undefined border was a potential issue that could again contribute to political instability in the strategic Caribbean region. Therefore, prompted by the United States, on January 1, 1929, the Dominican Republic and Haiti drew a new border line, the one that still exists (Price-Mars 1953, No. 3 P.209-213). In 1929 when President Vasquez and Haiti's President, Louis Borno agreed on a permanent border, the strokes of their pens created a larger foreign population on the Dominican side. After so many years of ambiguity over the borders, the people who lived in the border regions, and who were now arbitrarily assigned a new country, were not about to move. Creole speakers did not stop speaking their language, even though the land they lived on now happened to be Dominican. Still the ambiguities remained. Between 1935 and 1936, Presidents Rafael L. Trujillo and Stenio Vincent signed additional clauses and amendments to the 1929 treaty, finally establishing a permanent and clearly delineated border (Diederich, al. et. 1986 P. 218).

The preceding historical review has shown how the Haitian-Dominican relationship has had its periods of tension but also cooperation. The period of the Haitian-Dominican conflicts in the early 19th century led to suspicion and mutual distrust. However, these differences were set aside when later in the century Haiti helped the Dominican rebels in their struggle against Spain. Haitian-Dominican friendship reached its highest point of cordiality when a fixed border was finally established between the two nations in 1935. However, the 1937 massacre of Haitian migrants by Trujillo's troops signaled the beginning of a new period of Dominican popular

animosity characterized by the development of the “anti--Haitian” ideology. So profound and lasting were the effects of Trujillo’s propaganda that even today Haitians are the main scapegoats of Dominican society. (See details in Chapter III).

Chapter III: Haitian and Dominican Leaders: 1930 to the present.

The mind of a foreign policymaker is not a tabula rasa (Hudson, et. al. 1995. P. 217). It contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, and conceptions of nation and self. Each decision maker's mind is a microcosm of a variety of influences in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates (Hudson, et. al. 1995. P. 217).

In the making of foreign policy, awash in a sea of alliances, interdependences, cultural identities, and public opinion, individual leadership might seem to be a small consideration. But individual leaders do matter. Often the foreign policies of states reflect the views and personalities of powerful people in the foreign policy process. At times these individuals play such a dominant role that certain state foreign policies actually become synonymous with the leader (Beasley, et. al. 2002. P. 338).

How decision makers perceive reality is not easily studied because what decision makers see in any specific situation is an empirical question. As Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller suggest, it is essential to ascertain empirically how decision makers "mentally represent the situation, understand stimuli and process their choices." In other words, the causal relationships that are formed within the cognitive process consist of many elements. These may include the decision maker's philosophical beliefs about world politics, the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by an enemy, the perceived power of such an adversary, and judgment about the behavioral norms of other actors (Hermann, et. al. 1988. P. 426-427).

In regards to individual leaders who shape foreign policy, Rafael Trujillo is a prime

example. Trujillo rose to power via the Dominican Republic's National Guard, which was created by the United States. In the case of the conflict between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it can be said that the regime of the Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961) with the all powerful ruling party, aggressively propagated anti-Haitian ideology at national commemorations, holidays, and through a variety of vehicles including the schools, broadcast and print media.

In 1918, Trujillo was accepted into the Dominican National Guard and rose in the National Guard's ranks in the 1920s, as they fought against the Dominican guerrillas, who were fighting to free themselves from the United States occupation. When the United States pulled the Marines out of the Dominican Republic in 1924, they left Rafael Trujillo in charge of the Dominican National Guard. With the support of the United States, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo took full control of the Dominican Republic in 1930 and ruled until his assassination in 1961. Trujillo ran against incumbent Horacio Vasquez for president in 1930 and fraudulently, claimed ninety five percent of the votes. Once in power, he used the National Guard to terrorize the population and banish or kill all civilian opponents.

In 1935 and 1936, after the clauses and amendments were signed by Presidents Rafael L. Trujillo and Stenio Vincent establishing a clearly delineated border, Haitian-Dominican relations were at a high point. Trujillo even visited Port-au-Prince where he was warmly received. The Dominican press showered President Vincent and the Haitian nation with praise. It seemed as if the struggles of the 19th century were a thing of the past, gone and forgotten (Sagas 1994. P. 14-15.). Trujillo, however, felt differently. With the definition of a clear border between the two nations, Trujillo sought to increase his control over the Dominican Republic. For the dictator, the

border did not represent the limit to his authority, but rather the beginning of his domain.

In fact, the aftermath of the border treaty 1935—36, ultimately infuriated Trujillo (Sagas 1993, P. 1-5). Trujillo mistakenly thought that a fixed border would have meant a sealed border; that was not the case. The border treaty was a diplomatic agreement but for the peoples living on both sides of the newly-established border, little had changed. For decades after the end of the Haitian-Dominican wars, at the mid-19th century the border region had been a place where the authorities of both states had been very weak. This led to the development of a mixed population of *arrayanos*, Haitian-Dominicans who spoke Spanish and Creole, engaged in trade and contraband across the border, and did not owe allegiance to any state in particular (Baud 1993 a, P.5-28. 1993b P. 39-64). An inspection trip along the border directed by Trujillo himself confirmed the weakness of the Dominican state in the sparsely-populated border region (Cornielle, 1980).

Trujillo's response after the inspection trip to the border was swift and brutal. In October, 1937, he ordered the military to kill all Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Thousands of Haitians were killed in a few days using machetes and clubs, so as to give the impression that it was the uncoordinated action of Dominican farmers who had decided to settle old scores. Estimates on the number of dead have ranged from several hundred to 25,000, and Haitians were killed as far away as Santiago and Samana (Vega 1988, P. 386-387). Only those working in American-owned sugar plantations were spared (Vega 1988, chap. 10). After the 1937 massacre, Trujillo initiated a well-publicized program of "Dominicanization" of the border region. Development programs were implemented and white immigrants were encouraged to settle in the region. Trujillo's aim was to create a socio-cultural barrier against Haitian influences to reinforce

the military action of 1937. As part of his plan, the Dominican population was subjected to a constant barrage of anti-Haitian propagandas.

Trujillo also intervened constantly in Haitian affairs; first, with the intention of preventing Dominican exiles from using Haiti as a base of operations, and later, to influence Haitian politics for his benefit, by using bribes and intimidation to influence Haitian politicians (Crassweller, 1966). Haiti and Haitians went from being good neighbors to becoming the scapegoats of Dominican society. By stimulating a false nationalism, Trujillo sought to distract public opinion by focusing on a foreign enemy. No target was more convenient than nearby Haiti. Trujillo's loose propaganda eventually became a full-fledged ideology that is known today as *antihaitianismo* (Sagas 1993. P. 1-5). At the diplomatic level, however, relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo Era were correct and even cordial.

As a result of one man's ideologies, the balance of power had been altered. During the 19th century Haiti had been the more powerful nation on the island, but during the Trujillo Era, those roles had been reversed. The Dominican Republic became the interventionist country who meddled in its neighbor's affairs in order to protect its national interest. This reversal of roles had two main causes: first, the growth of the Dominican Republic population, and second, Trujillo's development of the Dominican army into an imposing fighting force (Sagas 1994 P. 14-15).

Trujillo was a cruel dictator, but he sat well with the United States until the twilight of his reign because he was an ardent anti-communist. The Dominican Republic progressively developed trade links to the outside world as Trujillo personally owned most of the nation's exporting industries, from chocolate factories, to shipping lines, to timber. Calculating that he would stay in power for a very long time, Trujillo brought in Swedish advisors to make forestry

sustainable in the Dominican Republic. The plan worked. Thus, Trujillo left an economic legacy for the Dominican Republic when democracy took hold after his death.

The actions of decision makers are the result of a combination of factors as part of the structure of the decisional unit, these factors include the personality characteristics of decision makers, how information is received and processed, what advice the decision makers received from their key advisers, the political coalition they are able to form, and the nature of domestic support and opposition. Therefore, the reasons behind Trujillo's decision to carry out the 1937 massacre were never clear (Vega 1988, chap. 10).

Trujillo's point of views changed in 1957 when Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) came into power. The dictatorship of Francois "Papa doc" Duvalier in Haiti, 1957-1971, implied a new modus vivendi in which the two strongmen (Trujillo and Duvalier) understood that it was mutually convenient to protect each other, rather than to fight each other. In October 22, 1957, following a series of military juntas, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier, a black Haitian of humble origins, was elected President. The United States officially financed his presidential campaign, believing him to be a reformer of sorts and knowing that he had been educated at the University Michigan Medical School. The election was reported by *Time magazine* (October 7, 1957). The peaceful election in Haiti ended a hectic ten months of intermittent rioting and revolt during which six governments tumbled and two election attempts failed. In 1963, Papa Doc, followed a precedent set by the last nine dictators, extended his term of office, and then declared himself "President for Life." The Haitian constitution was rewritten to accommodate this (Buss 2008 P. 25). During his reign, Thousands of Haitians were murdered, tortured, and unjustly imprisoned. Duvalier all but closed the country to reduce the external influence of those who were plotting

against him. Since Papa Doc feared the Mulatto aristocracy, he continued a movement, nourished under his regime to promote a kind of “black is beautiful” culture, that returned to things African and promoting power sharing among blacks (Corbett, 1994).

Duvalier became a devotee of the anti-colonial negritude movement, and espoused Voodoo. He did little to warm relations with foreign powers, or investors. Papa Doc expelled many French Catholic priests to try to eliminate foreign influences, an act that got him excommunicated by the Vatican. Duvalier kept his followers loyal by distributing public money, jobs, and benefits to them at the expense of the country. However, Duvalier was an avowed anti-communist. In Haiti, being a member of the Communist Party was a capital offense. So the United States, at the height of the cold war, tolerated Duvalier as its did Trujillo. Military assistance flowed in to Haiti to beef up the army, which Duvalier then used to support military factions loyal to him (Buss 2008 P. 27).

As stated before, individual personality and ideologies can shape foreign policy. If two leaders don't have the same point of views, problem can arise. The Presidency of Juan Bosch in 1963 in the Dominican Republic led to one of the tensest periods in contemporary Haitian-Dominican relations. Bosch, a liberal elected with broad popular support, saw in Duvalier a Trujillo-like tyrant, so he even supported the efforts of Haitian exiles who trained to overthrow Duvalier. Although Bosch was loved by many of his people, he faced a USA interference that would ultimately unseat him. In April of 1963, a diplomatic incident at the Dominican Chancellery in Port-au-Prince led to the mobilization of Dominican troops at the border. In August and September of the same year, Haitian exiles, under the command of former general Leon Cantave, attacked Haiti from bases in the Dominican Republic, but the exiles were driven

back into the Dominican Republic. In the end, his handling of the illegal incursion of the Francois Duvalier's secret police into the Dominican's Embassy in Port-au-Prince, on September 25, 1963 was used as an excuse by the U.S. controlled D.R. military to overthrow him (Diederich, et. al. 1986. P. 220-221). However, in 1965 a portion of the Dominican people, and supporters in the military revolted in an attempt to re-seat him as president. Thousands gave up their lives in this attempt. This leads us to President Joaquin Balaguer.

The election of Joaquin Balaguer as the President of the Dominican Republic in 1966 and his twelve-year tenure in power ushered in a new era in Haitian-Dominican relations. Balaguer had been one of the main ideologues of *antihaitianismo*, but he was also a pragmatic politician. During this period, a new generation of progressive Dominican scholars who questioned, criticized, and shattered the racist claims of *antihaitianismo*, came to age. Mostly basing their critiques on a Marxist conception of history, these intellectuals denounced *antihaitianismo* as being an ideological weapon of the Dominican dominant class (Cassa, 1975). As a result, the 1960s and 1970s were years of cordial relations encouraged by a leader (at least among the political elites) who was well-known for his anti-Haitian personal views. However, the fact remained that *antihaitianismo* was still a dominant ideology and a large part of the Dominican population shared at least some aspects of these ideas (Sagas1994 P.14-15).

As Haiti's political conditions deteriorated, especially from 1968 to 1970, Duvalier had to repel three separated invasions by exiled Haitian groups. In 1970 the Haitian Coast Guard mutinied. Resistance to both domestic and foreign challenges increased. Duvalier entrenched his rule through terror via the "Tontons Macoutes," which was his form of secret police (an estimated 30,000 Haitians were killed for political reasons during his tenure). The dangerous

political situation and the failing economy forced professional Haitians to flee to the United States, and Canada, while the lower class entered the Dominican Republic illegally in search of jobs. Before his death in 1971, Francois Duvalier designated his son, Jean-Claude. As Haiti's new leader, the Haitian elite, who still dominated the economy, found a new defender. In April 21, 1971 a constitutional amendment allowed power to be transferred to Jean-Claude Duvalier; called "Baby Doc," who was only nineteen years old at the time. The continuation of Duvalierism, without "Papa Doc," offered financial gain and a possibility for recapturing some of the political influence lost by mulattos under the dictatorship.

During the period of "Baby Doc" (1971-1986), Haiti acquired a reputation as being the source of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, an event that discouraged foreign investment and tourism, which in turn might have also adversely affected foreign aid (Buss 2008 P. 27). Epidemiological research has recently demonstrated that HIV/AIDS were transmitted from Africa to Haiti in 1969, whence it eventually reached the United States (Carmichael, 2007).

Jean-Claude tolerated the system, but was much less active in the day to day running of it, allowing subordinates to have greater authority; but, the system of terror remained essentially the same under both despots.

From 1984 to 1985, Haitians repeatedly rioted and demonstrated against the government. February 7, 1986 "Baby Doc" fled to exile in France after a month of popular uprising that left more than 50 people dead (*New York Times*; 12/17/90, P. 3.). Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. It was like this before the Duvalier's family took over except that the gap between Haiti and the other poor countries in the Western Hemisphere grew under the Duvalier reign. The economy suffered drastically during the 29 year reign of the Duvalier's family. Yet

their wealth and the wealth of those whom they chose to allow into their circle grew fantastically. The government killed 200 peasants who demonstrated for land reform. The military gunned down four schoolchildren, an event that contributed greatly to Baby Doc's downfall. In addition, Baby Doc eventually became despised by the Tontons Macoutes, in part because of his marriage into the mulatto aristocracy (Buss 2008 P. 27).

When Baby Doc was expelled in 1986, much of the Haitian economy crashed, as did the government itself, due to widespread unrest. Haiti assembly plants migrated to the Dominican Republic and thousands of illegal Haitians migrated with the plants. After Jean-Claude was expelled from Haiti, the capacity to govern Haiti was never fully restored, which affected Haiti for the two following decades. A three-man junta, led by his army chief of staff Lieut. Gen. Henri Namphy, took power. After Namphy was expelled on March 29, 1987, voters overwhelmingly approved a new Constitution, putting elections for President and the National Assembly in the hands of an independent Electoral Council. On January 17, 1988 Leslie F. Manigat, a University professor, was elected President in an army-controlled election. Then on June 19, 1988, troops stormed the National Palace, deposing President Manigat and replaced him with General Namphy. On September 17, 1988 General Namphy was ousted, in a coup led by noncommissioned officers, and exiled to the Dominican Republic. Lieut. General Prosper Avril, chief of the Presidential Guard and a Duvalier advisor, became President a day later (*New York Times*; 12/17/1990, p3,).

The post-Duvalier period may be viewed as a struggle to control the Haitian state by one or more of several competing political factions. In mid 1989, the political situation continued to be in a state of flux, and on March 10, 1990, General April stepped down as Haiti's leader, after

anti-government demonstrations. He fled to the United States. Many claimants to power competed with each other while Haiti's public institutions languished. Even Haiti's Armed Forces, the country's most powerful institution, suffered from factionalism, corruption, and a general breakdown in the chain of command.

Pressure to overhaul the political system increased. To a significant degree, the political crisis of the transitional period pitted regressive Duvalierist elements, who advocated complete or partial restoration of the *ancient regime*, against popular aspirations for change. March 13, 1990, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot took office as President of Provisional Civilian Government to govern with a 19 member Council of State and lead the nation to elections. On December 16, 1990, general elections in Haiti proclaimed Jean-Bertrand Aristide Haiti's constitutional President. Jean-Bertrand Aristide took office in Feb. 1991, with Rene Preval as prime minister.

On the other side of the island, in the Dominican Republic, Balaguer was elected for a fourth constitutional term 1986 to 1994 (Having been out of office from 1978-1986) . However, in 1986, Balaguer confronted an entirely new Haiti. With the fall of the Duvaliers, Haiti had entered into a period of social and political instability as different groups competed for power in order to fill the vacuum left by Duvalier's families (Sagas 1994 P. 14-15). Therefore, Balaguer's diplomatic approach during that period was a cautious one, as he feared that events in Haiti could have unexpected consequences for the Dominican Republic. Severe civil unrest in Haiti could provoke a flood of Haitian refugees fleeing into the Dominican Republic; a nightmarish situation that the Dominican government was not prepared to handle. Balaguer thus maintained correct relations with the Haitian administration and even granted asylum in the Dominican Republic to Haitian leaders after they had been overthrown (French, 1994a).

With Aristide and Balaguer, both democratically elected, democracy might have had a chance to flourish on both side of the island. Nevertheless, the election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990 caused a public relations problem for the Balaguer administration. Aristide, inaugurated on February 7, 1991 five years after the fall of the Duvaliers, was an outspoken defender of the lower classes. Aristide espoused liberation theology that had become popular in some quarters in Latin America, along with anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism (Aristide 1990, 1993; Gutierrez 1988). At the time, the conservative mainstream of the Haitian Catholic Church supported the military regime, Aristide's avowed enemies. Aristide and his political followers known as the *Fanmi Lavalas Movement*, sought to transform Haitian society profoundly. Aristide also openly denounced international forums such as the United Nations, the slave-like working conditions of Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. These accusations came in the midst of a wave of reports from human-rights organization such as Americas Watch, in addition to U.S. television news programs, and the International Labor Organization, in which the Dominican Republic was depicted as a human rights' violator.

To make the matters worse, the U.S. Trade Representative decided to review these allegations before certifying the Dominican Republic as eligible for the United States Generalized System of Preferences (Ferguson 1992, P. 87-88). An unfavorable decision would have certainly meant economic disaster for the Dominican Republic, as the GSP guaranteed preferential access to Dominican products into the U.S. market. Not surprisingly, Aristide became a persona non grata for the Balaguer administration, as well as for most of the Dominican economic elites (Sagas, 1994).

Because of so short a tenure in office (1990 to 1991), Aristide was only able to

accomplish a few of his populist reforms. Many also believe that Aristide was beleaguered by the attacks of the Dominican Republic's President, Joaquin Balaguer. President Aristide became the target of vicious personal attacks, by president Balaguer in an effort to destroy his credibility. Even politicians opposed to Balaguer, rallied behind Balaguer in a wave of anti-Haitian nationalism and launched vicious attacks against Aristide. A good example were the comments of Jacobo Majluta, a wealthy businessman of Arab ancestry and a Dominican presidential candidate in 1988, who stated

Jean-Bertrand Aristide did not attack President Joaquin Balaguer; he went to international forums to harshly attack the Dominican Republic . . . Aristide accused us (the Dominican Republic) in front of the OAS, ILO and the UN of all the evils of the world (Sarita 1993, P.4).

In addition Majluta was appalled at the fact that Aristide, on the day of his inauguration, took along a witch and walked the Bishop of that nation through the streets of Port-au-Prince in a shameful manner. Fabio Errera Cabral, Balaguer's Sub Secretary of Foreign Relations, warned that "Dominicans must be ready to counter any intrusion that Aristide intends in order to impose his ideas over the Dominican Republic" (Carbajal 1993, P. 16).

Balaguer retaliated in 1991 to Aristide's human rights accusations with Decree 233—91. The decree ordered the immediate deportation of all illegal Haitians under the age of 16 or over 60. Within three months, about 50,000 Haitians were deported (Ferguson 1992, P. 89). The Dominican military profited from this operation by confiscating the possessions of deported Haitians. The deportation decree was clearly aimed at further de-stabilizing the Aristide administration by sending home thousands of Haitians who were to join the ranks of the under- and unemployed.

On September 30, 1991, President Aristide, who had been elected with 67% of the total

vote, was overthrown by a military coup led by General Raul Cedras. It is noteworthy that the Balaguer administration did not condemn the coup against Aristide. On the contrary, for days after the coup, the Dominican press was saturated with opinion articles condemning Aristide and blaming his unstable character for the coup that toppled his administration (Cuello, 1991). Other articles noted that Haiti was a highly unstable country, practically ungovernable, and it was thus condemned to be ruled by strongmen. Furthermore, though the Balaguer administration had publicly offered to help in the resolution of the Haitian impasse and had officially supported the OAS embargo against the Haitian military government, it took actions to prevent, or at least delay, the resolution of the Haitian crisis. Although Balaguer wanted Aristide out, when Aristide was overthrown Sept. 30, 1991 the Dominican Republic had to absorb thousands of unwanted Haitian migrants and also beef up border security. In the aftermath of the coup, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Dominican Republic fell precipitously over the next two years, this was blamed on Haiti because it increase the Dominican Republic's population, and reduced the National Gross Product (Buss 2008, P.168).

The international relationship between the two nations seems to be different depending upon the leader in power. For instance, from his first appearance on the national and international stage, Aristide spent a great deal of energy intentionally antagonizing the Dominican Republic, the United States, Canada, and France, even when it was not in Haiti's interest to do so, and even when it harmed his supporters, the U.S. government and donors. Aristide reached out to Cuba and Venezuela for assistance as an act of defiance, knowing this would gain him little and would jeopardize chances of receiving aid from the international community. Aristide also openly criticized the Dominican Republic in international forums such

as the United Nations, OAS, and ILO creating a great deal of tension in the relations between the two nations (Sarita 1993, p, 4).

As a result of all of this, Aristide's efforts to consolidate power failed. General Raoul Cedras successfully led a military coup against Aristide's government in 1991-1994. Following Aristide's departure, the international community embargoed the Cedras regime. Violence during the coup internally displaced thousands of Haitians, who once again fled to the Dominican Republic, Canada, and the United States. In any case, the embargoes were voluntary and were not particularly effective in influencing the Haitian military, but they were very effective in further destroying the economy and making the lives of poor people even worse.

In 1993, the Balaguer administration authorized the sale of foods and fuel to Haiti for "humanitarian reasons" (Perez 1993, P. 1-16). Later, when the OAS embargo was tightened, in a clear violation of OAS imposed sanctions, all sorts of goods—but mainly gasoline—were carried over the border and into Haiti in full view of the Dominican military, who profited enormously from this contraband via kick backs (French 1994b). In conclusion, the international embargo was as strong as its weakest link—the Dominican Republic.

In October 1994 Aristide resumed his presidency under the protection of the 20,000-man multinational force, and the United Nations lifted the sanctions and embargo the next day. Because the Haiti's constitution limited presidents to one five-year term and because Aristides had reluctantly promised the Clinton administration that he would not extend his term, he couldn't run in the presidential election in December 1995 (Buss 2008 P 33). As a result, Rene Preval, a close associate of Aristide and a past Prime Minister, was duly elected president in December 1995 and took office in February 1996 until 2000. Aristide won the presidential

election held later in November, 2000. Opposition parties boycotted the election, which meant that Aristide was easily able to win.

In September 2003, Amiot Metayer (the Cannibal Army gang leader and on-again, off-again Aristide supporter) was assassinated. His brother, Buteur, avenged him by joining forces with the ex-soldier paramilitaries to overthrow Aristide in February 2004 (Buss, 2008, P. 38). The United States later sent in military troops to restore order and advised Aristide to leave the country. Most explanations for Aristide's fall focus on the interplay of a complex set of forces, all aligned against him. The ex-military, Tontons Macoutes, and Neo-Duvalierists were against him (McCarthy, 2004). From 2004 to 2006 there was a transitional government under the auspices of the U.N. On February 7, 2006, Haitians elected Rene Preval president, with a turnout of 60 to 65 percent of the eligible voters.

Rene Preval, in contrast to Aristide, showed considerable skill in juggling sensitive relationships with a number of international partners, and did a fairly good job of steering the country until the March, 2010 earthquake. He knew that Haiti's future depends on striking a balance between courting the United States, Canada, and France on the one hand and the nations in the Caribbean and Latin America, on the other hand; especially the Dominican Republic, its closest neighbor. He knew that Haiti is part of the Caribbean and Latin American community (he has been respected in CARICOM). Although, he also had relations with Cuba and Venezuela, Rene Preval did not engage in anti-American rhetoric or champion communist causes, and tried to partner with the West. Miraculously, Preval managed to meet with Cuban, Venezuelan, and Bolivian leaders at the 2007 Latin American Summit held in Chile, and seemingly gaining their praise without precipitating a negative response from the United States (Buss 2008, P. 173).

Preval's first foreign visit, after being elected president on February 7, 2006, was to the Dominican Republic, in recognition of that country's importance to Haiti. In November 2006, Dominican and Haitian officials met to devise a strategy for patrolling the shared border, which has always been a problem as officials in both countries accept bribes to allow people to cross the border illegally (Buss 2008, P. 175). By nearly all accounts, Rene Preval has been successful in conducting foreign policy, at least until the earthquake. At that time, Rene Preval became overburdened with rescue efforts, the restoration of minimal services, the rebuilding of the nation's capital, relocation of the homeless, allocation of donated funds, food and equipments, while attempting to work in cooperation with the U.N., OAS, Haitian Parliament, and the United States government – all of which have different agendas.

What is problematic about small underdeveloped states and micro states is that the change of command can alter foreign policies. These types of states have not developed their institutions sufficiently to carry out policies regardless of who is in power (Betances 2001, P. 7-31). In the case of the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Relations has been used to dealing solely with the United States and not looking at regional and international relations. In the Dominican Republic Balaguer (1966-1978 and 1986-1994), Antonio Guzman Fernandez (1978-1982) and Jorge Blanco (1982-1986) continued the same foreign policy format which dealt only with the United States.

The Dominican Republic's foreign policy has been historically subordinated to the United States' political, economic, and geographical interests. This persisted in the context of the Cold War and under the conservative administrations of Joaquin Balaguer. Despite efforts by Antonio Guzman and Salvador Jorge Blanco, their governments could not establish a clear

foreign policy initiative. When Balaguer returned to power in 1986, he did not pursue an active role in foreign policy and the nation went back to its dormant status in regards to foreign relations. This attitude was basically due to Balaguer's belief that a small nation such as the Dominican Republic has no choice but to accept that the foreign policy is largely constrained by the United States' political and economic interest in the Caribbean.

However, when Leonel Fernandez was elected president of the Dominican Republic in (1996), international conditions were favorable for promoting of the foreign policies of small underdeveloped nation states. Three basic factors created these favorable conditions. Firstly, the end of the Cold War meant the lowering of tension because of the disappearance of real socialism. This new context allowed for the development of foreign policies which focus essentially on economic affairs rather than on ideological and political issues. Secondly, United States promotion of free and fair electoral competitions has forced conservative and authoritarian political forces to accept that liberal candidates can win elections and actually rule and thirdly, the emergence of Fernandez as a leader who is genuinely interested in foreign policy helped to create more favorable conditions for change.

A look at the story of Leonel Fernandez may help us put in context the new direction of the Dominican Republic's foreign policy. Leonel Fernandez, the current constitutional president of the Dominican Republic (1996-2000; 2004-2008; 2008 to the present), is also the Chairman and President of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) and the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development. Since he took over the presidency on August 16, 1996, Fernandez set up a dynamic and aggressive foreign policy that rescued the Dominican Republic from the traditional isolation and positioned it in the very center of the regional integration process. This

has allowed it to be a global competitor in the open market.

Participation in regional organizations was crucial for the successful insertion of the Dominican Republic in the globalized economy. This was of particular significance for the Dominican Republic because it had remained marginal concerning regional affairs. Fernandez's administration argued that the nation needed to join its neighbors in trade and investment associations in order to compete successfully with other trading blocs.

Fernandez's trips to Haiti and Cuba stand out from most of his travels because of the political significance these countries have for the Dominican Republic. Haiti not only shares its border, but there is a large presence of Haitian migrant workers in the country, a significant number of which are illegal. Fernandez visited Haiti, in June, 1998, addressed the Haitian Parliament, and held conversations with the Haitian President, Rene Preval. President Leonel Fernandez signed a few minor accords with Preval to establish cooperation in tourism, regularize commercial taxes at the border, establish a direct postal link (which had been severed since Trujillo's massacre), and promote cultural exchanges.

Recognizing the historical conflicts between both countries, President Fernandez is attempting to forge new ties that would create the groundwork for greater cooperation in many areas of interest to both countries. However, despite good intentions, Fernandez has continued the policies of his predecessor, Joaquin Balaguer, regarding key issues such as migration, trade, drug-trafficking, and cultural exchange. Still, as a result of the Haitian-Dominican Bilateral Commission created under Balaguer, over the years, both governments made joint requests for funds from the European Union to implement developmental projects on their border. Despite this advance, however, neither government has made significant progress on the migration

issue – the most pressing matter for the two countries. In addition, all efforts are stalled since the earthquake. Like his predecessor, Fernandez continued to deport illegal Haitian workers.

While mass deportations stopped in December 1999, Fernandez has been deporting Haitians in recent years. Migration issues were not be resolved by the Bilateral Commission, and probably will not be in the near future. This issue has as much to do with the Dominican demand for Haitian workers, as with Haitian's need to migrate to the Dominican Republic for work and better living conditions.

Based on what has been presented, we see how the personalities and point of views of an individual leader can be main components that shape a country's foreign policy. Scholars investigating the role of individuals in foreign policy have suggested that leadership tends to be more important depending on the nature of the situation or on the nature of the individuals themselves. An individual leader tends to be more significant in shaping a state's foreign policy when the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, and complex, especially in small countries such as the Dominican Republic and Haiti, where the leader is the primary decision maker, rather than delegator of his or her authority to advisers. There has also been a tendency among foreign policy scholars to assume that individual leaders are more important in the developing countries than in industrial countries. Haiti's dysfunctional, unstable political system – in place for 200 years – is proof of this. Throughout its history Haiti has been one of the Western Hemisphere's most politically unstable countries. Of the fifty-four elected presidents since 1806, only nine completed a full term. The rest were overthrown, were killed, or died in office. Many presidents attempted to extend their terms of office by imposing highly repressive authoritarian rule. This in turn led to at least a hundred revolts, coups, and uprisings (Buss 2008, P. 4). Under this political

environment it is difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate a peaceful and stable relationship with the Dominican Republic. The logic here is that so much political turmoil effectively feeds the whims of individual leaders.

Chapter IV: Societal Influences shaping the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

There are two broad categories of factors that can be examined at the state level: Governmental and societal. Governmental factors include the type of political system, the type of regime that sits atop the government, the division of powers and authority within government institutions, bureaucratic in-fighting among government agencies, and the size and institutionalization of bureaucracies. But in this analysis I will mainly concentrate on the Societal Influence on Haitian and the Dominican foreign policy.

Societal factors include interest groups in the form of NGOs, the history and biased opinions of the people of the country, the ethnic, racial, and religious mix of the people, political parties, and the role of the media in setting the public agenda (Neack 2003 P.78-79). This chapter will include discussions about the internal and external societal influences affecting the Dominican Republic and Haiti's relationships.

An examination of the inner societal workings of Haiti and the Dominican Republic can yield interesting insights into how and why these countries maintain such a discordant relationship. Societal influences shape foreign policy, and foreign policy shapes the interactions of countries. Foreign policy studies at the societal level of analysis involve examining different aspects of a country to see which of those factors shape its foreign policy (Neack 2003 P. 77).

The Dominican Republic and Haiti share the island of Hispaniola and are broadly similar in terms of geography and historical institutions, yet their growth performance has diverged remarkably. Haiti's economic system is so broken that it has become almost totally dependent on

the international community for its survival. As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, its poverty has created constant frictions between itself and the Dominican Republic due to Haiti's economic dependency for jobs in the Dominican Republic, its illegal immigration activity, and the use of the D.R.'s infra structure. Their presence increases the cost of housing, sanitation, health care, and transportation. The increased demand for these services puts a strain on the nation's and the individual state budgets, and reduces the Gross National Product

Haiti's political history, both distant and recent, does not give much confidence in a stable, prosperous future. Rapacious governments, natural disasters, international interference, widespread crime, social unrest, and poverty have plagued the Haitian people at repeated intervals over the years. The succession of social crises and the numerous false starts by the international community to address Haiti problems have left many Haiti observers, including those in the Dominican Republic, to believe that the situation there is ultimately futile.

Because Haiti has become so dependent on outside help, external societal influences are always impacting on its foreign policy and internal policies. Therefore, it has little control over its own government. Particularly relevant is the role Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The international development community has tried to work to bring Haitians a better quality of life, particularly through non-governmental organizations. Yet there seems to be frustration in the NGOs communities that the Haitian government is not capable of improving the lives of their citizens. Conversely, there is often frustration in Haitian governmental circles that NGOs choose their own projects without adequately consulting with the government and coordinating their work in a synergistic fashion (Mintz, 1995).

For decades, Non-governmental organizations perform the bulk of essential services for

the population in Haiti; this is particularly true in regards to health care and education, yet there is no system in place now to regulate these activities. The Haitian government does not have a comprehensive list of which NGOs are operating in the country or what project they are implementing. NGOs activities are not coordinated to support the objectives established by the government. There are no uniform standards set by the government to establish consistent guidelines for projects (Mintz, 1995). If the Haitian government cannot control its internal affairs, it will be more difficult for them to implement international treaties that can contribute to a better relationship with the Dominican Republic. Improved access to health care, water and sanitation, education, shelter, and food are essential components needed for promoting social stability in the near future. The government will improve its legitimacy as a nation in the eyes of the Haitian population when the government can support these services regularly.

Interest groups also can articulate a particular societal sector's position and mobilize that sector to pressure and persuade the government. Interest groups come in a variety of forms. They may, for example, be based on a single issue, on ethnic identification, on religious affiliation or on economics. Non-governmental organizations focused on human rights, are becoming increasingly visible in the Haitian and Dominican issues. Networks devote considerable energy to convince governments and other actors to publicly change their positions on issues. This is often dismissed as inconsequential change, since talk is cheap and governments sometimes change discursive positions hoping to divert network and public attention. Yet Network activists try to make statements into opportunities for accountability politics once the government has publicly committed itself to a principle. Networks strive to uncover and investigate problems, and alert the press and policymakers; once an activist described this as a "human rights

methodology”— promoting change by reporting facts (Thomas 1993, P. 83).

The condemnation of the Dominican Republic by activists network made up of both domestic and foreign NGOs, in their attempts to help the Haitian people, have also added to the friction between D.R. and Haiti, making it more difficult to have good foreign relations. Since the 1937 massacre of Haitian people by Trujillo, the Dominican Republic has constantly been condemned by NGOs for its mistreatment of Haitian migrants. In a seminar sponsored by the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights in July 1980, sixteen Protestant church-related groups from Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and the United States, condemned “. . . the economic, social and political causes that have led to the exploitation of thousands of Haitians who work in the Dominican Republic under unjust circumstances”(World Council of Churches 12). The WCC concluded that “. . . the conditions of migrant workers and the systematic exploitation which they suffer make it one of the worst situations in the world. Denied every basic right their plight can only be compared with the slaves of Caribbean History (*Black Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2006).

In June 1981, as a result of a petition filed by Cecil Rodgers, the Worker’s delegate from Suriname, the treatment of Haitian laborers in the Dominican Republic became a major item on the agenda of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Accusing the Dominican Republic of violating provisions of the Convention on Forced Labour, the petition criticized the country’s practices relating to recruitment, transportation, housing, working conditions, payments and living conditions. Among the specific charges was that recruitment was “carried out on the basis of false promise,” and force was utilized when sufficient numbers of workers were not recruited (Miller, 2006). Rogers contended that “the use of forced labour, disguised as a social and

economic outlet for workers is, in fact, a way for the Dominican state to make enormous profits.”

The ILO was asked to urge the Dominican Republic to halt its practice of forced labor and to initiate an inquiry to assure that the rights of Haitian workers were being observed (ILO, 135—136). The ILO responded to the petition by establishing a Committee of Inquiry, which proceeded to investigate the grievances. Among its recommendations was that a small number of qualified officials, acting under the auspices of the Haitian Embassy in Santo Domingo, be empowered to visit plantations and other places of labor in order to become aware of working conditions. It also recommended that the Haitian Government be permitted to conduct periodic visits for similar reasons. A third recommendation was that those Haitian workers, given the lack of unionization, be allowed to designate representatives to work out the day to day problems affecting them.

NGOs introduced new ideas, provided information, demanded and lobbied for political changes. Because the Dominican Republic did not agree to some of the demands made of it, the NGOs took their case to a larger arena. When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the *boomerang pattern* of influence, characteristic of transnational networks may occur. NGOs bypass their states and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside. This is illustrated by the continued efforts of human rights organizations to persuade the United States to use its influence to alleviate the abuse of Haitian migrant workers in the Dominican Republic. The assumption was that the United States, as a major trading partner, could use trading preference and foreign assistance as major weapons to secure Dominican adherence to international law; yet this did not occur. For decades, the United States has been criticized for not using options available to it to relieve the Haitians' plight both

at home and abroad (Miller 2006, P. 46).

Failing to achieve its goal by appealing directly to the host nations and those nations which have influence upon them, human rights advocates have turned to the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter encourages the solution of the problems within regions when possible. With that in mind, it has been the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS which has heard most of the complaints concerning the abuse of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Although they meant well, the intervention of NGOs in regards to the Haitians plight in the Dominican Republic have increased the animosity between the two countries, because their actions are seen by Dominican Republic's politicians, and a great part of the society, as an interference in the Dominican Republic's internal affairs. Over the years, Dominican officials have said the changes would most likely result in the repatriation, not the integration of most Haitians who are now in the country (Navarro, 1999).

This example of NGO intervention, on behave of Haitian workers, might result in a negative outcome if the Dominican Republic decides to expel all Haitians. By feeling besieged, the Dominican Republic might indulge in an aggressive, preemptive foreign policy to protect the country's sovereignty. Studies of siege mentality, such as Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi's study of Israel siege mentality, suggest that governments are given permission by societies to conduct aggressive, preemptive foreign policies in order to protect the "good nation" from the actions of "evil nations". (Neack 2003 p.83). Bar-Tal and Antebi define siege mentality as "a mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions toward them." This culturally shared and perpetuated belief

is complemented by the belief that the group is alone in the world that it cannot expect help in times of crisis from anyone and therefore “all means are justified for group defense” (Bar-Tal, et. al. 1992.13, No. 4,).

Public Opinion

Haitian- Dominican relations are particularly influenced by racial and cultural differences. The differences affect the way they understand and interact with one another. Race is created by attaching social and cultural significance to physical features or colour, and then by grouping individuals according to phenotype appearance. Colour categories represent arbitrary ascription or imposed discontinuities along a continuous spectrum; they play an important role in social definition and self-description, and become a sign of cultural and social affiliation (Howard 2007, P. 731). Degrees of whiteness and blackness not only denote racial distinctions, but also allude to the over-emphasized European or African ancestries, hence forming cultural associations and racial alignments assumed origins (Bailey 2002, P. 153). Racial categories are specific to person and place, but it is the categorization that creates the racial boundaries and context for targeting Haitians for violent or discriminatory actions by Dominicans. The longevity of this racial profiling rests with the society and the state’s misunderstanding of racial identity.

The racial and cultural values that form a society, constrain its leader’s foreign policy choices. It has been argued that leaders are selected by how much of the traits and qualities, valued by a given race and culture of people, they possess. One notorious example was a series of anonymous, but arguably pro- Balaguer party sponsored, faxes that were sent on the eve of the 1994 Dominican presidential elections. This group used graphic cartoon images of the main opposition candidate, the late Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, showing him engaged in brutal

satanic rites. The images were aimed at convincing the Dominican electorate of the Haitian origins of Pena Gomez and his family; the implication was that he believed in *voodoo*, thus would pose a serious treat to Dominican civility (Wucker1999. P. 161-162, 188-195; Sagas, 2000 P.105-115). Thus we see how race/culture can influence politics and potentially spill over into foreign policy decision making.

To capture the senses of popular opinion in the Dominican Republic, *Antihaitianismo* permeates every aspect of Dominican culture from everyday talk, to literature and public education. A history of tense relations between the two countries, (the creation of an anti-Haitian ideology by Trujillo, during his 31-year-long regime), and the reinforcement of these prejudices and distorted historical notions by subsequent administrations, have made *antihaitianismo* an integral part of the Dominican popular and political culture. *Antihaitianismo* is a set of attitudes that are acquired early in life and reinforced by the socialization process (Sagas, 193). Family and friends are the first agents of this process. More important, however, is the role played by public education. Public education, unlike the teachings of family and friends, is not a loose, uncoordinated, and incomplete process but is coordinated and formative. It is institutionalized, supported by the state, and is designed to plant certain thoughts into the minds of Dominican citizens (Sagas, 1994). It is in school where Dominican children learn the historical facts that they will identify with later in life. They are taught to distinguish themselves from Haitians who are seen as inferior because of they skin color and culture.

Many Dominicans commonly use the term *Indio/a* when asked to describe their racial identity; or *la raza*, the latter conflating territorial notions of nationality with a sometimes biologically or aesthetic description of self. Racial identity may be translated and understood in

the Dominican context as a concept of belonging, which implicitly excludes others of different physical appearance or cultural activities. (*Indio*) it is a popular rhetoric concerning race in the Dominican Republic, and often refers to assumed biological connections, with *dominicanidad* defined in opposition to the neighboring society of Haiti. In addition to distinct racial identity issues is the language barrier, as was brought up by President Nunez de Caceres as he welcomed Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer, giving him the key to the City of Santo Domingo in a gesture of friendship.

The word is the instrument of communication among men, and if they do not understand each other through the organ of the speech, there is no communication; and thus you see here a wall of separation as natural and insuperable as...the Alps or the Pyrenees (Demorizi 1975. P. 17).

These have gone down as prophetic words in Dominican history because it is still affecting the relationship between the two countries.

The differences in languages, values, and worldview between the two nations are so vast that they add up to a “clash of cultures.” With a radically different history, language, and set of cultural traditions, Haiti inspires fear and dislike among many Dominicans (Ferguson 1992, P.8). Spanish is spoken in the Dominican Republic, a glib observation no doubt, but one with vast implication in the relationship between the two countries. Spanish is the world’s second most widely spoken language, including over half of the Americas. Meanwhile, some 85-90% of Haitians speak Haitian Creole, leaving the country in a state of “linguistic isolation.”

Jared Diamond, in his book *Natural Experiment of History* stated that:

. . . this not only impedes Haiti from communicating and integrating with the Dominican Republic and other Spanish speaking nations and parts of the Franco-sphere save a few Caribbean outposts, but Creole speakers have also nursed a chasm with Haiti’s elites, who speak formal French (Diamond et.al. 2010”).

Racial and cultural factors are said to likely be especially prominent in “highly political negotiations” between Haiti and the Dominican Republic because much of the sources of the problem is the different racial and cultural values and beliefs. Racial legacies are of primary importance among a Dominican population where cultural, linguistic, and religious similarities are widespread. Racial identity is closely tied to one’s national self image and a culturally maintained national self-image does more than just influence the broad notions and directions of a country’s foreign policy. National self-image and the culture that supports it, also influences the type of institutions constructed within a state and its foreign policy decision-making institutions. Haitians and Dominico-Haitians (those born in the Dominican Republic) form a large minority group in the Dominican Republic. For decades they have been crossing the border, either by invitation or illegally. In a region highly divided by colonial legacy, culture and language, migrant minorities have always faced the threat of discrimination and exclusion. This threat is magnified, when the people who pose it do not reflect or reinforce the cultural identity or national self-image of the Dominican Republic.

Government and other powerful groups in all receiving countries are ambivalent towards illegal migration. Politicians and the media are sometimes inclined to view the issue as a problem, claiming that immigrants put intolerable strain on social services and the environment. But the reality is that national self-image contains a message (implicit or explicit) about those outside the nation—our nation is good, therefore other nations are not (as) good. This mirror image may even suggest that vigilance must be the constant order of the day or the good nation will be at risk (Neack 2003, P. 83).

Unfortunately, we see that race can sometimes play a huge role in how a nation sees itself and how it wants to present its national self image. The difference in the languages and religion may also give the Dominican people pause when faced with absorbing Haitian people into their nation. These seeds of distaste and fear were fed by Trujillo when he massacred not only Haitian immigrants, but also Dominicans who were dark, like Haitians. Thus the Dominican people may perceive the Haitian people as a threat to their way of life, because the Haitians do not reflect the Dominican mulatto mixture.

Chapter V: External factors affecting Haitian-Dominican Relations

One of the primary factors affecting Haitian and Dominican foreign policy is “Dependency.” Dependency can be defined as the development of a state that is heavily influenced externally in terms of economics, politics, national developmental policies and eventually, its culture (Sunkel, October 1969, P. 23). These external influences include multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interest abroad. Studies suggest that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always equally shared (Ferraro, July 1996).

Hispaniola today, and since the sixteenth century, has been part of an international system dominated by the now-developed nations. Latin America’s underdevelopment is the outcome of a particular series of relationships to the international system (Bodenheimer 1996, P. 157). The world consists of a group of rich nations and a large number of poor nations. It is usually held that economic development takes place in a series of capitalist stages and that today’s underdeveloped countries are still in a stage of history through which the now developed countries passed through long ago. However, the countries that are now fully developed have never been underdeveloped in the first place, though they have been undeveloped (A.K. Bagchi, 1982).

Underdevelopment is a condition fundamentally different from *undevelopment*. The latter term simply refers to a condition in which resources are not being used. For example, the

European colonists viewed the North American continent as an undeveloped area because the land was not actively cultivated on a scale consistent with its perceived potential (Ferraro, July 1996). On the other hand, underdevelopment, as it is the case of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, refers to a situation in which resources are being actively used, but used in a way which benefits the world dominating states, and not the poorer states in which the resources are found. The distinction between underdevelopment and undevelopment places the poorer countries of the world in a profoundly different historical context. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are not “behind” and “catching up” to the richer countries of the world. They are not poor because they lagged behind the scientific advancements or the enlightened values of the European states. They are poor because they were coercively integrated into the European, and later the American economic system as producers of raw materials, to serve as repositories of cheap labor, and then were denied the opportunity to market their resources in a way that competed with the dominant states.

All states, regardless of their type of political system, their history, or their culture, reside within an international system that limits the choices they can make. The worldwide distribution of economic wealth and military power, and the actions of other powerful states, multinational corporations, and international organizations often mean that states cannot pursue their preferred options in foreign policy (Beasley, et. al. 2002, P. 8). Scholars of foreign policy have long recognized that to understand how states behave toward each other, it is important to understand the influence of the systemic factors and the external actors and conditions that are outside the control of policy makers.

International anarchy means that there is nothing to prevent states from intervening in the

affairs of others. Weak states such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic are especially vulnerable to intervention because, if either their stronger neighbors or the most powerful states in the system take an interest in directing their affairs, there is little that such states can do to stop them. Thus, it is difficult to say whether great power intervention in weak states will occur most often in unipolar, multipolar, or bipolar eras. All we can say with certainty is that weak states might always be vulnerable to intervention, because anarchy means there is nothing to rule it out and great power “tempts one” to intervene, whether to balance the power of other states or simply “for the good of other people” (Waltz 1979,P. 27).

Not long after Columbus launched the conquest of the Western Hemisphere from Santo Domingo, external factors began to affect not only the foreign policies of both countries but the island as a whole. The present day division of the island of Hispaniola is a consequence of the bitter European struggle for control of the New World during the 17th century, when France and Spain began wrangling over control of the island. They resolved the dispute in 1697 by splitting the island in two different countries (Wucker, 1996).

France and Spain remained the powers on the island until the latter 19th century, which marked the emergence of the United States as a world power. The development of American industry after the Civil War, the process of capital accumulation, and the search for new markets and areas for investment, accelerated the expansionist impulses of imperialism. Then, following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Latin America experienced its “Manifest Destiny” through the Monroe Doctrine. Based on the Monroe Doctrine, diplomacy took ever changing forms depending on the historical features of each country under the United States’ domination; from the subtle diplomacy of displacing the English, or by meddling in internal

politics with the application of the “big stick” (Castor et. al.1974. p. 253). Whatever its form, the goals of this policy remained clearly defined: strategic control, supplanting of the European powers, economic domination, and the search for maximum profit from investments.

In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt, continued the “big stick policy.” In his annual message to Congress, he defined his country’s new role: “Some States, unable to obtain justice at the hands of foreigners and unwilling to do justice to those foreigners who treat them well, may force us into the position of having to undertake action to protect our rights” (Castor et. al. 1974, p. 253). By this declaration, he left no doubt that he was referring to the Caribbean and Central American republics, where there was too much political disorder and regimes were overthrown on an almost continual basis. In particular he referred to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both of which at the time found themselves in explosive situations. It was these countries therefore that experienced, among others, the ‘Big Stick’ policy.

United States and Haiti

During the first years of the twentieth century, coinciding with the centenary of its independence (1904), the last vestiges of a more or less stable government in Haiti disappeared. No government was thereafter able to maintain itself in power for a reasonable period of time, until 1957.

With the backdrop of likely U.S. involvement in WW I, Haitian instability was unacceptable. Between May 4 and July 27, 1915, four ephemeral governments succeeded one another in Haiti. The U.S. Department of State had already resolved, some time previously, to occupy Haiti and was merely awaiting the right moment. Encouraged by the situation developing in the country, it proceeded to land Marine infantry forces on Haitian soil (Castor et. at. 1974 P.

254). Thus, with the American occupation on July 28, 1915, a new page opened in Haitian history. The neighboring Dominican nation had also undergone a phase of chronic agitation at the turn of the twentieth century. Therefore, a year later, Vice Admiral William Caperton who was directing operations in Haiti, lead the military action which was to govern the fortunes of the Dominican Republic. All of this served to disturb relations between the two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Haiti's political history tends to reinforce the racist notion among some that Haiti, simply, is a black republic and hence unable to govern itself. To put it in other way, Haiti is the product of its own self-made destiny (Buss 2008, P. 5-6). But this view ignores the fact that foreign nations have meddled extensively in Haitian affairs and have not made much effort to bring Haiti into the world community, or to help the Haitian people. In fact, assistance to Haiti and intervention in Haiti have made the country worse off in many respects.

Virtually throughout the country's history, Haitian politics has tended to run afoul of U.S. foreign policy interests, even under sympathetic U.S administrations—especially when Haitian ideologies moved towards the left. As a consequence, the United States has felt compelled at times to embargo and restrict assistance, and also to influence assistance offered by bilateral, multilateral, and to some extent charitable organizations. Haitian politics has also precipitated intransigent cleavages within the U.S. Congress, political parties, advocacy groups, ideologues on the political right and left, and Haitian expatriate communities, depending on whether they supported or criticized the official U.S. position. This has made consensus building on Haiti all but impossible (Buss 2008, P. 6-7) it has also reduced prospects for aid effectiveness and increased the friction between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, due to the amount of refugees

that flee Haiti to the Dominican Republic.

The United States has played a determining role in Haiti's internal and external affairs dispatching the Navy or Marines dozens of times to restore order, protect Americans and their business interests, or to meddle in political affairs. The United States occupied the country from 1915-1934. Since 1915, five presidents have been forced out of office by the United States—sometimes with the support of the Haitian people, sometimes not. Since the 1980s, the United States has manipulated Haitian governments with foreign aid and “coercive diplomacy” using it as leverage over Haitian affairs (Buss 2008, P.4-5). This has made Haiti's foreign policy non-existent, as other nations could not deal with Haiti directly but had to go through the United States.

The first United States intervention in Haiti took place in 1915, following the brutal lynching of President Guillaume Sam by the opposition. It was then that the United States began a nineteen-year occupation of Haiti, justifying its incursion with an intention to teach the Haitians democratic governance. The United States feared the possibility of German intervention in Haiti during World War I, and President Woodrow Wilson asserted global democratization as a foreign policy goal. Prior to that, a national bank was formed in Haiti and underwritten by a New York bank. As a result, the United States developed an interest in the nation's affairs. Eventually, U.S. corporations pressured President Woodrow Wilson into taking a controlling interest in the Haitian custom houses in order to stabilize the Haitian economy (as had been done in the Dominican Republic in 1905). When the presiding president of Haiti was overthrown, the U.S. decided to intervene, not necessarily for the sake of Haiti, but to protect U.S. business interests. Franklin Roosevelt, then Secretary of the Navy, drafted the Haitian constitution, and

then imposed it on Haiti in 1917. The new constitution allowed foreign ownership of land, which had been prohibited since Haiti's independence. The Haitian legislature tried to draft an 'anti-American' constitution in response, but the Wilson administration was so outraged it forced President Sudre Dartiguevave to dissolve parliament (Buss 2008, P. 24-25). U.S. Marines killed thousands of Haitian patriots in a widespread peasant revolt that lasted from 1919 to 1920. Also the economy was opened to foreign investment and for the first time in the history of the nation, foreigners were allowed to own Haitian land. Furthermore, the United States created an army trained in counter-insurgency methods (Schmidt, P. 63-68).

For the entire nineteen years that the U.S. occupied Haiti, its primary focus was on making sure that Haiti paid its U.S. creditors at the expense of the nation's economic development. The United States abruptly left Haiti in 1934 without preparing it for self-government. At the time, Roosevelt promulgated the Good Neighbor policy for Latin America, which stated, "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another" (Buss 2008, P. 24).). A presidential commission of 1930 had criticized the American occupation as "a brusque attempt to plant democracy by drill and harrow" and went on to point out that the United States had failed to train Haitians for self-governance, or even to understand their own country's problems (worldbank.org,2004). Earlier in 1921, a Senate committee investigating the U.S. presence in Haiti and abuse of Haiti's rights, had complained that the administration was not in fact preparing Haiti for self-government, as it had claimed, but was justifying the 1915 invasion. Although the U.S. officially pulled out of Haiti in 1934, United States administrators continued to dominate the Haitian economy until 1947, when all debts to the United States financial institutions had been paid off (Schmidt, P. 101-114). The United States interventions

yielded mixed results. Americans helped with infrastructure projects in Port-au-Prince from 1915-1934, while also strengthening the forces that have kept Haiti largely immobile, including elite control of the economy and essentially institutionalizing the flow of Haitian labor to be exploited in the Dominican Republic (Mintz, 1995). The armies the Americans left behind sprouted two of the hemisphere's most brutal dictatorships: that of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina in the Dominican Republic (1930-61) and that of the Duvalier, father and son, in Haiti (1957-86). Thus we see how an external force such as the United States has affected, and all but eliminated Haiti's foreign policy, and the Haitians ability to develop an effective interaction with other countries.

The economic strangulation of Haiti created a legacy that is still felt today, and has not only had a tremendous, negative impact on its people, but also on its foreign policy. Impoverished Haitians flee their country, creating emigration problems among all its neighboring countries, especially the Dominican Republic, which is another country with limited resources. This foreign-made dependency, created by external sources, is one of the foremost reasons for the rift between Haitians and Dominicans.

The situation today is remarkably similar in Haiti. The country is occupied, and although the occupying troops wear blue helmets, everyone knows that Washington calls the shots (Weisbrot, 2011). Haiti already dogged by corruption and non-existent infrastructure, was further crippled by a January 12, 2011 earthquake that killed more than 225,000 people, displaced 1.5 million and left the capital in ruins (Schmidt, 2011). Michel Martelly, who was elected president of Haiti in 2011, has vowed his first six months as president will focus on moving hundreds of thousands of quake survivors out of squalid tent cities, tackling a resilient cholera epidemic, and

boosting agricultural production. But a potential time-bomb lies in the path of the newly elected president, and that is the presence of former Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier and Haiti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. These two giants of Haiti’s political past recently returned from exile, Duvalier from France in January 2011 and Aristide from South Africa in March 2011. Although they have stayed out of politics so far, their lingering presence is an unsettling factor. President Michel Martelly is due to take office on May 14, 2011, and this will open a new chapter in the Haitian political scenario.

In regards to the Dominican Republic, concern over European intervention stemming from the Dominican Republic’s debt to a number of countries resulted in the United States’ first intervention. From one century to the next, the European influence in the Dominican Republic (French, English, German, and Italian) had given way to the United States. The process began in 1905, with the eviction of the *Banco Nacional de Santo Domingo*, a French firm by the Santo Domingo Improvement Company of the United States (Knight, op. cit., Chap. III). Thenceforth, American companies strengthened their hold over all aspects of economic life. They monopolized the freight lines between Dominican ports and those of the United States; they gained exclusive control of mines, railroads, the larger cane, coffee, cacao, fig, and banana plantations, in addition to breweries, and consumer products as well as the production of electricity and port construction. The foreign debt was taken over, and import/export activity was exclusively between the United States (De la Rosa, Antonio 1915. P. 92). Starting in 1905 the American dollar began to circulate as the national currency, together with the Dominican peso.

A further step in the direction of imperialist penetration occurred with the signing of the agreement of February 8, 1907, enabling American authorities to ensure the collection and

handling of all custom duties for the republic(except for those of Puerto Plata, which were controlled by the Santo Domingo Improvement Company). By virtue of this agreement, the Dominican government lost the right to amend custom tariffs or to contract loans. The Americans were now regulating both the financial and economic life of Santo Domingo (Castor 1974, P. 253—275).

Four years after this attempt to establish stability in the Dominican Republic, it was President Woodrow Wilson's turn. Instability and conflict again enticed the U.S. to intervene in the Dominican Republic. President Wilson's decision to deploy the U.S. Navy in 1916 was based on his personal principles and growing uncertainty in world affairs (Gomez, spring 1997). In the Dominican Republic, the United States' military occupation lasted for eight years (1916-1924), was when President Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced a new approach toward U.S.-Latin American relations by implementing the notion of the Good Neighbor Policy. Through this policy, "American statesmen formally renounced the right to intervene militarily in the affairs of Latin American countries." This policy did not imply the absence of the U.S. role in the future of Latin America; it simply meant that other means of influence would be employed. "The Good Neighbor Policy meant new tactics, not new goals" (Gomez, Spring 1997). Therefore, the United States explored and executed various means to sustain its control over the Caribbean, while maintaining this non-military interventionist philosophy. The list of tools available to the U.S. for domination and control, ranged from export quotas (and the creation of economic dependency), in addition to supporting caudillos and dictators.

General Trujillo won the 1930 elections, the results of which were highly suspect. Despite early ambivalence and distrust towards Trujillo, the United States soon accepted his

authoritarian style appreciating his ability to enforce stability and preclude U.S. intervention. The foreign debt was transformed into an instrument of domination by American financial circles. Consequently, the American occupation did not succeed in developing or in establishing the infrastructural bases to foster an agricultural industry. Neither did it give birth to a consumer market that could support manufacturing, nor did it even succeed in stimulating the mercantile relationship between the metropolis and the rural areas in its periphery. It never created an important commercial bond with the world market that could have provided the stimuli required to incorporate Haiti and the Dominican Republic into the capitalist economic world market, and make this the dominant factor in its social and economic formation. Indeed, Haiti remained a pre-capitalist country in which a shaky economy continued to be subordinate to the American economy and commercial transactions, with world traders assuming a reduced weight in the overall social and economic organization.

There was a huge surge in the economic sector, but the benefits of those bonanza years were only experienced by the U.S.'s investors. Haiti and the Dominican Republic reaped no profit from it. As the historian Melvin Knight notes that "Much has been said about the favorable balance of trade between Santo Domingo and the United States, which has sometimes reached millions of dollars. The truth is that those millions of dollars never returned to the country." It becomes difficult to understand how this is favorable to Santo Domingo (Knight 1939, op. cit., p. 150). In 1961 General Trujillo was assassinated creating political turmoil in the Dominican Republic which lasted from 1961-1965, which was when on April 28 1965, United States forces found themselves in the Dominican Republic protecting U.S. interests for the fourth time in fifty-eight years. However, the Johnson Administration's decision to invade the Dominican Republic

in 1965 was based on erroneous information, the President's own concerns over the possibility of "another Cuba" in the hemisphere, and the residual effect that it would have on U.S. efforts in Vietnam (Gomez, Spring 1997).

Relations between the Dominican Republic and the United States have changed dramatically since this period. The United States has a strong interest in a democratic, stable, and economically healthy Dominican Republic. The country's standing as the largest Caribbean economy, second-largest country in terms of population and land mass, with large bilateral trade with the United States, and its proximity to the United States and other smaller Caribbean nations make the Dominican Republic an important partner for the United States in hemispheric affairs. U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic are excellent, and the United States has been an outspoken supporter of that country's democratic and economic development. The Dominican government has been supportive of many U.S. initiatives in the United Nations and related agencies (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs June 7, 2010). The two governments cooperate in the fight against the traffic in illegal substances. The Dominican Republic has worked closely with the U. S. law enforcement officials on issues such as the extradition of fugitives and measures to hinder illegal migration.

The United States supports the Leonel Fernandez administration's efforts to improve Dominican competitiveness, to attract foreign private investment, to fight corruption, and to modernize the tax system. Bilateral trade is important to both countries. U.S. firms, mostly manufactures of apparel, footwear, and light electronics devices, as well as U.S. energy companies, account for much of the foreign private investment in the Dominican Republic.

Chapter VI: Conclusion: Moving Toward better Relationships

In my final analysis I found that factors such as the nature of Haitian and Dominican leaders, especially the political and economic greed of both countries' leaders, international political and economic interventions by Europeans, and Americans, and more recently, the intervention of governmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition, we might add, embargos, culture clashes, huge immigration-related problems, racism and genocide that all of which suggest why the discordant relations exist. However, as was stated throughout this thesis, one can not look at the problems between Haiti and the Dominican Republic without understanding the role that foreign policy plays in this discordant relationship. The study of foreign policy usually focuses on the foreign policy of strong states. It is less common to analyze the foreign policy of Third World countries, not only because they are regarded as too weak and vulnerable to be influential, but also because finding an appropriate theoretical framework for the study of foreign policy in countries such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic is an extremely complex task.

Against this background, my thesis has endeavored to challenge these pessimistic perspectives by assessing the effectiveness of one of the approaches to the study of foreign policy, that is, the *Levels of Analysis approach*. This critical assessment has revealed that this approach is a functional, theoretical framework for the analysis of Haiti and the Dominican Republic's foreign policy. Levels of analysis in foreign policy are like a window where an outsider can look inside at the internal or domestic makeup of states. Doing so helps us understand pieces of the "Puzzles" of the different behaviors of states at different times or in different circumstances. Thus we might understand the conditions under which they will

cooperate, or coordinate their actions with other international actors, or see under which circumstances conflicts might develop, escalate, or even lead to war.

In that regard I have looked at the question, “Why have Haiti and the Dominican Republic had such a discordant relationship throughout their history?” and have used the lenses of the three major levels of analysis. They are: the individual level (the individual personalities of the decision makers and of those who have access to the decision makers and help to shape the policy making process), the state level or internal influence within the given country that impacts on foreign policy, and the systemic level or global influence that shapes foreign policy. The three levels of analysis must be integrated if we wish to understand this complex relationship. In addition, historical factors were looked at as major contributors to the problem.

Haiti and the Dominican Republic’s historical context have played an important role in this analysis, giving me a better understanding of the beginning of the resentment between the two countries. Though Haiti and the Dominican Republic may share one island, their histories unfolded quite differently. As a result of the European conquest, these republics developed visible, structural differences, arising from their unique social and historical dynamics. It is a fact that the present day division of the island of Hispaniola is a consequence of the bitter European struggle for control of the New World during the 17th century that led to the two rival colonies that were virtually forced to follow different paths that would greatly affect their political, economic and ecological futures. Because the island was divided, and Haiti’s larger population was forced on a smaller land mass that was less fertile than the east side of the island, it sold off its trees for income. This eventually ruined the soil and ruined the Haitian economy. Eventually, the Dominican Republic’s economy began to grow while Haiti’s economy began to decline.

When Haiti's economy began to fail, it increased unemployment. Because of economic hardships, the Haitians began to look to the Dominican Republic, not only as a way to protect their sovereignty from foreign powers, but also for jobs and a better way of life. This was the beginning of the Haitian dependence upon the Dominican Republic, and the immigration problems. All of this contributed to the different economic trajectories of the two countries.

Another factor affecting the relations of both countries is the difference in the ethnic make-up. The Dominican Republic with its Spanish speaking population of predominantly European ancestry was more attractive to European immigrants and investors than was Haiti, with its Creole-speaking population. As the majority spoke Creole, and outsiders did not, the Haitians could only effectively communicate amongst themselves and not with people from other countries – making them practically isolated. In addition, their population was composed overwhelmingly of black, former slaves. In Santo Domingo, racial intermarriage between the Spaniards and the Blacks created mulattos who are today the majority. This difference in ethno-racial makeup helped amplify Dominican /Haitian rivalry, because of different values around racial identity. Looking at Haitian history, one sees the effects of race throughout. The French conquerors completely changed the demographics of Haiti, not only by wiping out almost all of the native population, but also by populating the western part of the island with displaced Africans. The legacy of the colonial system and the power structure divides, marked by racial differences, affect Haiti to this day. Though the racial divisions of the Haitian social class have diminished much in the last century, the reverberations of old racism can still be felt, as the legacy of slavery continues to affect the politics in the United States today.

A. Leaders

Just as history played a part in the discord between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, leaders also played an important role at the individual level. All human behavior is ultimately based on one's individual personality, but individual actions are magnified greatly by the roles individuals play in communities and organizations. National interests are defined and put into play by individuals. The power of individuals is magnified when they become the leaders and members of large organizations. The president of one country is a single individual, but his power as an individual is amplified by his organizational role; the office and the man merge. Therefore, as was shown in Chapter III, individual decision makers have had a great influence on the friction between Haitians and Dominicans for centuries.

Among the leaders who greatly contributed to the animosity between the two countries, was Jean Pierre Boyer. In the 19th century, the Haitians saw the island as indivisible, and eventually the Haitians occupied the Dominican Republic for twenty-two years. Jean Pierre Boyer, the Haitian president, sought to secure his control of the Dominican Republic through the destruction of the Hispanic culture. He closed the university and prevented contact between the Dominican Church and the Catholic hierarchy in Europe. He broke up the large estates of the Dominican nation held by Church. This policy increased anti-Haitian sentiment in the Dominican Republic (Sheridan 1997, P. 36). The animosity of Dominicans towards Haitians remains so strong that instead of celebrating their independence from Spain, their colonial conquerors, they celebrate their independence from Haiti in February 27, 1844 (Haq, 1996). When Trujillo was elected president in 1930, he defined the Dominican Republic as a "Hispanic nation, Catholic and White, "as opposed to "Afro-French Haiti" which largely practiced

“voodoo” as a religion. He portrayed Haiti as both a threat and the antithesis of Dominican culture. He dreaded the growing influence of Haitian culture in Dominican territory. His fear of Haitian “*darkening*” of the Dominican population led him to conduct a policy of “*Dominicanness*” which ultimately led to the murder of more than 25,000 Haitians on the Haitian-Dominican border. Although most people did not approve the Trujillo’s massacre, Dominicans continue to harbor significant distrust towards Haiti as a result of the revolution and Haiti’s 19th century occupation of Santo Domingo. This history, plus the various inflammatory versions of it, distributed by the state-run media and school systems, especially under the Dominican dictator General Rafael L. Trujillo, had created the perception that Haiti and Haitian immigrants are a threat to the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic. However, Haitians do not regard Dominicans in the same negative way that Dominicans regard Haitians.

Years later, the Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, (1966-1978, 1986-1996) continued with a policy of discrimination and racism against the Haitians. In his book, *La Isla al Reves*, Balaguer outlined his hopes and fears for the Dominican nation. This book is a monument to the fear that Haiti, as an Afro-Caribbean nation, instilled in both the author and the Dominican people. It warns of Haitian imperialism being a “plot against the independence of Santo Domingo and against the population of Spanish origin.” It claims that Haiti is a threat primarily for “biological reasons,” and says that its people multiply themselves “nearly as rapidly as plants” (Balaguer, 1993 *La Isla Alreves*). It would be unfair to attribute, entirely, Trujillo and Balaguer’s use of propaganda as the origin of the acrimony, (even though Balaguer and Trujillo were both racist mulattos who used the past for their own political ends) but Trujillo, Jean Pierre Boyer and Balaguer are examples of how individuals contributed to the discordant relationship

between the two countries.

B. State and Societal Influence

Influence at the state level also has an important role in my analysis about Haiti and the Dominican Republic, because the states continue to be the primary building blocks of foreign policy analysis. We have defined a state as having a territory, a human population, a central government with effective control over its territory and people, and an illusory legal status called sovereignty. That being said, some scholars of Constructivist Theory might say that the foreign policy of every state has distinct cultural characteristics, defined by the historical legacy, the religious or social traditions and /or the economic and geographic nature of the state itself. All these factors come together to form the mindsets of the people. Therefore, the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic involves people at all status levels, from the political leadership and corporate elite, down to the peasants and urban proletariats. In other words, the conflict is not just between the Haitian and Dominican states but their civilian population as well.

C. External Influences

This is due in part to the fact that small states are, among other things, inherently vulnerable to external intervention by, and pressure from, larger powers and from international financial institutions; are highly vulnerable to various transnational threats, and are economically weak as a result of limited access to external financing, undiversified economic structures, and vulnerability to the forces of nature, and (Brave boy-Wagner 2008, P.12).The island of Hispaniola was one such vulnerable island. Haiti and the Dominican Republic would not be the nations they are today without the European colonial invasion. In their conquering pursuits, the Europeans completely changed the demographics of the Hispaniola Island. The division of the

island into Haiti and the Dominican republic is a perfect example of how external factors such as colonialism shaped the geography, demography and the psychology of the new world; shaping it in ways that eventually led to perpetual friction between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The repercussions of the conquerors' invasion reverberate even to the present day.

In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, foreign intervention accentuated the structural historical imbalances of the two countries. Their intervention interfered with the natural evolution of the two countries, compromising their autonomous economic and social /political development. It created a new and illegitimate structural and institutional configuration that corresponded to the role of dependency, which had been conferred upon these countries by the hegemony of foreign power. The subsequent development of these nations, their system of social organization, their foreign policy, and their very definition, in terms of social and economic development, remained marked by the impact of this deforming force (Suzy et.al 1974, P253-275 Massachusetts Review).

Foreign powers helped cripple Haiti, creating a handicapped, nation so that now Haiti represents one of the most complex and deeply rooted challenges facing Dominican and the U. S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. It is "... a failing state on the doorstep of the world's most powerful nation" (Erikson, 2004). By nearly any measure, Haiti ranks among the most difficult places to live, with social problems rivaling the war-torn countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Haiti remains plagued by an ongoing political conflict, increasing citizen upon citizen violence and deteriorating institutions. In 2004 Haiti celebrated its bicentennial anniversary of independence, yet the second oldest republic in the Americas is still gripped by a crisis that threatens to become a permanent feature of the regional landscape (Erikson, 2004). The 2010

Earthquake has magnified all problems enormously.

On the other hand, studies have found that economic performance in the Dominican Republic has been favored by political and macroeconomic stability. The World Bank (2006b) argues that the Dominican Republic experienced a more enabling environment for private investment than Haiti due to political stability and stable macroeconomic conditions over prolonged periods that allowed it to follow a more diversified and outward oriented growth strategy. Because of this relative success, Haitians may view the Dominican Republic as a land of opportunity and this has created an uncontrollable migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic. Traditionally, this migratory flow has been met with intellectual and political opposition from the Dominican ruling classes. Nonetheless, the number of Haitians within the Dominican Republic is over one million and their presence is crucial in almost all areas of industry, from tourism to agriculture and constructions. Poor people in Haiti are not the problem, and should not be the targets of blame. They have nothing to do with causing the situation in the Dominican Republic. If any people can claim to be victims of tyranny, it is Haiti's poor. The fact is that the political system in Haiti has impoverished its people for hundreds of years. Haiti's elites and aspiring elites bear responsibility for this, along with external powers.

It should be remembered that Haiti's current situation is not the result of one government's failure, and it will take time to rectify decades of mismanagement. The people of Haiti are desperate for change, but change for the sake of change is only going to make things worse. Everyone in the country has to understand that it will take a collective effort – an effort in which every Haitian will have to play his or her role to bring the country to fiscal, social and

economic stability, Asking, or perhaps expecting other countries to solve their problems is a mistake that must be avoided in order to move forward. Haitians will have to rise above political conflicts and others divisive internal issues. They must hit the reset button to guide Haiti towards political stability, prosperity, and peace without relying on excessive foreign aid, subsidies and handouts, otherwise, animosities between Haiti and the Dominican Republic will always persist.

Even though the Dominican Republic is more economically and politically stable than Haiti, it is a country with limited resources; thus Haiti remains a perceived threat to the Dominican Republic. Hundreds of thousands illegal immigrants are crossing the border, fleeing from the instability of their country, and becoming a fiscal burden on the Dominican's society, and a social problem due to the differences in culture and beliefs. Adding to this is the cost to maintaining thousands of military troops at the border to constrain the passage of not only the illegal immigrants, but also those stricken with Cholera. At the moment, it's difficult, if not impossible, for Dominican authorities to find a middle ground for a better understanding of their neighbor, and as a result, the Dominican government has been accused of pursuing an active anti-Haitian policy by human rights groups in the United States, Haiti, and even by those within its own borders.

Specific Recommendations for Haiti: The Haitians Government and Donors

The Dominican Republic would like to assist Haiti, but it can be daunting when prior foreign assistance to Haiti has failed to achieve its goals and is likely to continue to do so long into the future. Therefore, for these reasons, the Haitian government and Haitian elites need to be more concerned with good governance, rather than politics and personal ambitions. The Haitian government has to stop abdicating responsibility, meet the needs of the citizens and not

leave this responsibility to bilateral and multilateral donors. There needs to be a shared vision or consensus as to where the country should be headed and who should lead it. This would lessen dependency. Less dependence is needed because aid dependency has negative consequences for developing countries, especially those like Haiti. Aid dependency undermines institutional quality by weakening accountability, encouraging “rent seeking”, facilitating corruption, fomenting conflict over control and distribution of funding, . . . siphoning off scarce resources from the civil service, and alleviating pressures to reform from government” (Knack 2000; Klein and Hartford 2005). The government’s objectives are often hazy and subject to change. Plans and policies are not approved or implemented. Its actions are often diametrically opposed to the project carried out, and often no one is in charge (Canadian International Development Agency 2003, P. 12). There needs to be more commitment to the development process. Lack of commitment to the development process is a root cause of Haiti’s poor performance (U.S. General Accounting Office 1982, p. 9).

The Haitian government needs to develop an agency that will help to properly oversee the maintenance of funds for the projects. The Haitian government failed to provide maintenance funds for most projects, especially roads, irrigation, water, sanitation, education, and health. The national government also failed to develop any revenue-generating capacity in poor communities outside Port-au-Prince, leaving them unable to maintain the infrastructure funded earlier by donors (InterAmerican Development Bank 2003 b). Thus, Haiti’s infrastructure is in ruins, in spite of the expenditure of millions to develop it, and this was even before the earthquake. Although donors can greatly assist a country, working with donors is an increasingly complicated affair. Donors expected returns on their investments, and if there were no noticeable

returns they might reprogram money or withhold it. Donors enforce strict compliance with myriad regulations, policies, and laws and exert extensive controls over expenditures, and insist on transparency in all dealings. Donors' requirements in these areas varied. Donors had very different development philosophies, administrative cultures, and political concerns, which often conflict, not only with a country's goals but also with donor's goals as well. It is not surprising that even the best intentioned government might fail to hold up its side of the foreign assistance equation.

Much remains to be learned by donors and recipient nations such as Haiti. First of all, donors must understand the entire aid process, and make decisions from a holistic perspective, not in a fragmented, isolated, and unconnected fashion. Much conventional wisdom may not work in fragile states, or at least has not worked in Haiti. Thus the first and most fundamental lesson learned in Haiti is: *Understand foreign aid as a unified process* (World Bank 2004 b). They also must deal with governance issues first. Governance in Haiti unfortunately seems to have been built on corruption because of conditions that encouraged corruption: low civil services salaries; the ubiquity of bribes and embezzling; lack of transparency and accountability; ineffective legal systems and enforcement that is an impediment to investigations and prosecutions; tolerance of corruption and lack of commitment to put an end to corruption. Generally, the more corruption there is the less effective aid is (Kaufmann 2005).

Haiti has been ranked as the most corrupt country in the World by Transparency International (TI), followed by Burma and Iraq. Despite a decade of progress in establishing anti-corruption laws and regulations in Haiti, today results indicate that much remains to be done before we see meaningful improvement in the lives of the Haitian citizens. Without putting anti-

corruption at the core of Haiti's reconstruction and development, even a Haitian Marshall Plan could easily become just another "failed beginning" (Klitgaard March, 2010). Haiti and its friends should take a crack at developing a strong, practical strategy against corruption. It won't be easy. But if successful, this effort would pay off in many ways, including better projects and programs for Haiti's reconstruction, and a better chance for the medium-term economic strategy. This would be one of the first steps in remaking the way Haiti will be governed in the future.

One of the reasons corruption exists is because there is too much power in the hands of a few. If decentralization of government was put into place it would help to decrease corruption. It is time for policymakers to start thinking about decentralizing government, and some Haitians already have begun. In August 2007, four mayors of cities – located on the border with the Dominican Republic – developed a cooperative strategic plan to manage the region. This is a great start. If corruption could be eliminated, the Haitian government could focus on educating its people. The primary policy area for Haiti at this moment is education.

Moreover, any step forward must combine educational reform with agricultural reform. Haiti needs a plan to address the agricultural issue and bring about change. A strong school curriculum in Haiti would have to include agriculture as a major subject of study from kindergarten to the end of secondary school year (Vedrine, 2004). The better educated the younger generation is, the more conscious they will be of problems such as deforestation, erosion, and lack of irrigation in the areas of the country where water can be found. It would be a good idea to teach students how to create nurseries to help with reforestation projects, while teaching them the importance of doing so.

Nothing might better symbolize the vicious cycle of poverty in Haiti than the process of deforestation. Haiti was once a lush tropical island, replete with pines and broad leaf trees; however, by 1988 only, about 2% of the country had tree cover. The most direct effect of deforestation was soil erosion. In turn, soil erosion lowered the productivity of the land, worsened droughts, and eventually led to desertification, all of which increased the pressure on the remaining land and trees. Most of Haiti's governments paid only lip service to the imperative need for reforestation. In the past, for every tree planted seven were cut down to be used for charcoal. Efforts to save Haiti's trees and its ecosystem should focus on intensifying reforestation programs, reducing waste in charcoal production, introducing more wood-efficient stoves, and importing wood for construction purposes.

When peasants don't have land to work, or irrigation to water their small plots of land, when the price of food is very high, they have to leave their small rural towns and move to Port-au-Prince. There, they hope to find something — a job in the factories and if not, enter illegally into the Dominican Republic to work in construction, the sugar cane and coffee fields, or risk their lives on the high seas, trying to smuggle onto a boat that would take them to Miami. However, if there was a radical reform in agriculture that irrigated the land, reforested the country and educated the people, the trend could be reversed. Then those Haitians from the countryside in transit, to Port-au-Prince or to the Dominican Republic in search of a better way of life, would go back to their native provinces to work their land. They would return because effective government and private programs would have helped to irrigate the land; would have given them access to fertilizer and farm machinery to help them plow the land and take part in other agricultural activities that would keep them employed on their own land, in their own

country. This would be the beginning of reduced dependency on the Dominican Republic, which could lead to the hope of a better relationship between the two countries.

Hope for the Future

Hope for finding some solutions to alleviate, in part, the animosities between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is not yet entirely lost. Leaders of both sides of the island have to understand that the problems that began more than three hundred years ago are still there. But it is important to understand that both opportunity and wiliness are required for a compromise to occur; they are jointly necessary conditions (Russett al. et. 2004, P. 19-22). Sooner or later, Haiti can find the path to lead its people to a better life, where they don't have to immigrate or depend on foreign aid; then its government will have absolute control of its foreign policy. After that, we need a more tolerant Dominican Republic, one that understands that constant contact and high levels of interactions provide the opportunity for frictions between societies, so the Dominican's leaders have to learn to work around that. Therefore, being a neighbor has a price to pay and it is to live together in a constant reconciliation mode. Once those conditions are set, then you have an open avenue to find a middle ground.

Despite all that has transpired between the two countries reconciliation is possible. Cooperation is a better strategy than conflict. Yet, some analysts might point out that the animosity that arose was due to Haiti's early nineteenth-century attempts at the political domination over the entire island, and the massacres ordered by Trujillo in 1937 as the key to the Haitian and Dominican Republic animosity. However, those scholars don't give extended consideration to past and present evidence and instances of cooperation and between the Haitian and Dominican people and their governments.

Despite the main motif of dissonance and friction, a historical analysis of several periods of Haitian and Dominican history reveals significant examples of cooperation. There were times when Haiti came to the aid of the Dominican Republic. The Haitians not only abolished the loathsome institution of slavery in the Dominican Republic in a first attempt in 1801, but also helped to expel Napoleon's troops that occupied Santo Domingo for seven years. In 1822 Jean-Pierre Boyer, Haiti's President, ultimately abolished slavery brought about some measure of prosperity in the Dominican Republic through land reform by dividing the land among the poor people, and by the opening of ports in the East section of the Dominican Republic to legal commerce with other nations (Franco 1993, P. 186-188). In addition, Haiti gave support to the Dominican's final struggle for independence from Spain in 1865. This type of cooperation shows that a better relationship between the two countries is possible. In the last decades, there have been the warm personal relations between the Dominican president, Leonel Fernandez, and the Haitian president, Rene Preval. Recognizing the historical conflicts between both countries, President Fernandez is attempting to forge new ties that would create the groundwork for a greater cooperation in many areas of interest for both countries, particularly in the area of immigration.

The impressive solidarity demonstrated by the Dominican Republic, in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in the neighboring Haiti, has already led to improved relations between the two countries. The humanitarian response shown by the Dominican people to victims of the horrific earthquake in Haiti has opened up possibilities for an improved relationship which would benefit both countries in terms of commercial and immigration issues. The Dominican authorities took a number of steps, which were of enormous

importance, in assisting the humanitarian operation. The Dominican authorities opened up the border and suspended deportation of Haitians for several months and waived visa requirements for foreign humanitarian workers traveling through the Dominican Republic to Haiti. Supplies were transported to Haiti through the Dominican Republic, while Dominican search and rescue teams and humanitarian assistance were sent. Many injured Haitians have been treated in Dominican hospitals. Virtually, every level of the Dominican government reached out to its Haitian counterpart.

The problems confronting Haiti are daunting indeed, but they are not insurmountable. New hoped-for commitments from the Dominican Republic such as an agreement regularizing migration, better labor conditions for Haitians working in the Dominican Republic and repatriation for those who were unjustly uprooted from the country are a good beginning. Innovative policies from the Dominican Republic are required to help the Haitian government help itself. Doing so successfully will decrease the friction between the two countries, because the Dominican Republic will no longer have to serve as a social relief valve for Haiti.

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