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TUESDAY, April 6, 1965

Kauffman Quits Race After Slate Defeated

By FRED ARIAS

Student Government Treasurer Martin Kauffman announced last Friday that he was withdrawing his candidacy for the Presidency. Kauffman explained that his Fusion ticket was "defused" in the by-elections when none of the candidates on his slate won.



Carl Weitzman
Hopeful

He noted that three people who had been considering running on the Fusion slate in the May elections had changed their minds because of ideological or political reasons. Kauffman said the slate had been a compromise on the students as students issue but to many prospective slate members "the compromise was no longer acceptable and student as students had become the sole issue on campus." He added, "in this case people have paraphrased Goldwater's famous quote 'extremism in the defence of students as students is no vice.'"

Student Government President John Zippert, who announced "I am seriously contemplating running for re-election," said Kauffman's move "polarized the issues and the candidates."

Zippert's analysis was that the people in Kauffman's slate "felt they were running with the wrong person." Zippert said the election would be a choice for students between a student government that the student body on campus and would program activities for in the community or adjust laws.

Kauffman said that a few people had suggested he run for Treasurer but Kauffman said he thought "you have to make room for the people in the lower classes."

Noting that his withdrawal left no compromise slate, Kauffman predicted "it's going to be the biggest mud-slinging campaign in history."

Councilman Carl Weitzman, running for President on the Campus First slate, said Kauffman's withdrawal "has clarified the issues. It has improved my

chance of winning." Weitzman withdrew "because he has suffered intemperate abuse from people who were supposed to be his friends."

Film Shows Plight Of Soviet Jews

Fifty percent of Soviet citizens executed for "economic crimes" during the past few years were Jews. This and other alleged examples of Soviet anti-Semitism were depicted in "The Price of Silence," a documentary film shown last Friday at 2 PM in Room 217 Finley.

The movie, presented by Hillel, was narrated by Edward G. Robby Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg and US Senator Jacob Javits.

The film showed that Jews were not permitted to have a Yiddish language press, literature or theater. Other Soviet nationalities are allowed such cultural activities.

Mr. Robinson, acting as a prosecutor, presented witnesses who alleged that Jews are forbidden to educate their young in the Jewish religion, the Soviet Jew cannot obtain prayer books or prayer shawls without great difficulty, and the number of synagogues in the country is severely limited.

The film showed that Jews are forced to carry a passport on which their Jewish identity was marked.

It is used to discriminate against the Jew in employment and education.

A U.N. sponsored study was also mentioned which stated that Jews are the scapegoat of a propaganda campaign to divert attention from the corruption of the Communist party.

In discussion following the film Marc Tiebwasser, former president of Hillel, told of his trip to Russia sponsored by the Jewish Youth Mission. He mentioned his smuggling of prayer-books to the deprived Jewish citizenry. White attending services at the Moscow synagogue, he said that several persons there were pointed out to him as "spies" for the Soviet government.

Brooklyn Prexy Adamant on Issues

By RON MCGUIRE

Three leaders of the Student Protest Movement (SPM) at Brooklyn College found "no point of agreement" in a meeting with Brooklyn President Gideonse, Friday. In a two hour meeting Gideonse refused to retract statements he had made on ABC-TV last week alleging that the leadership of the movement was being manipulated by "Communists."


Gideonse charged that the movement was "irresponsible" and only represented "60 or 80 students" who were "always protesting," according to one student. The President also denied charges that there was a lack of academic freedom at Brooklyn College and claimed that the issues advanced by the SPM "weren't of interest to the school at large."

Another student characterized President Gideonse as being "sarcastic" and generally contemptuous towards the SPM leaders and of reiterating his stand that they were being controlled by "off-campus" elements and "Communists."

Gideonse maintained that the rallies staged by the SPM last week, two of which were attended by 500 students, were composed of students who were "mostly innocents" drawn by the leaders of the movement, which had no widespread support.

Gideonse maintained that he was not responsible for the regulations which the students were protesting, but that these regu-

(Continued on Page 7)



Aquabelles swim in star formation at Friday's "Tribute To the Arts."

Colorfully Dressed Aquabelles Pay A 'Tribute To The Arts'

By P. WARFIELD

Decorated with Doric columns and plants, a setting reminiscent of Roman Baths, the Park Gym pool last Friday, was host to muses of the arts, Shakespearean maidens and the "artistic soul." These were among the pretty things that floted by, dancing in the water as the girls of the synchronized swimming team, or, as they call themselves, the "Aquabelles," presented a "Tribute to the Arts."

Playing before a large and appreciative audience, the girls swam in formation, made stars, went down toes pointed heavenward, all to the sound of music that varied from oriental to folk to Jazz.

The girls were costumed in colorful suits of red, yellow, pink, even black, often with silver or gold trim. For various numbers they wore crowns, delicate veils, orange blossoms and two clowns wore oversized, bright red pom-poms.

One especially well-received number was the "Dedication to the Unknown Artist," in which the soloist sunk into the pool wearing a black veil, long black gloves and a black shimmering swimsuit. She tore off the veil, and slipped mysteriously into the water. Here she executed some notable steps, including some difficult slow upside-down turns with almost the entire leg held above water.

One might have hoped for more ensemble numbers, since these were most easily seen and most impressive, at least to the untutored eye. Unfortunately many of the solo and group numbers utilized vertical movement which were difficult to see from the viewing stands.

Elections . . .

Linda Weber will oppose Dennis Hoogerman in a run-off election today for the Class of '66 Council seat. Voting will be from 11 AM to 3 PM in Knittle Lounge and opposite Room 152 Finley.

Exec Committee Vote Unfavorable On Term Tenure

A constitutional amendment to change terms of office for SG executive positions from one year to one term was given an unfavorable recommendation by the SG Executive Committee yesterday. The vote was one in favor, three opposed and one abstention.

In another action, the Executive Committee also reported out with an unfavorable recommendation a resolution to censure Observation Post for un-

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Alabama March: Front Line Analysis

The need for a continuous white northern presence in the South in order to prevent reprisals against the Negro people of Alabama was stressed on Friday by Arthur Korn (Sociology). Joined by Student Government leaders who had participated in the Selma-to-Montgomery March, Professor Korn told an audience of 80 students about his experiences in Selma and on the march.

"The sheriff and his posse took a lot of pictures of the demonstrations in Selma," Professor Korn said. "Large numbers of Negro participants will lose their jobs as a result of this." He added that 2,000 people lost their jobs in one day.

A member of the Medical Committee on Human Rights, Professor Korn suggested that students, especially psychology and sociology majors, join the Committee, which provides medical care for people involved in the civil rights struggle in the South. "Modern middle-class youth spend most of their time waiting to consume," he said. "When they participate in the fight for civil rights, they better themselves in the process."



Howie Simon
Saw No Moderates

The audience heard a tape made by Professor Korn in Selma. Part of it was made at a victory party which he attended to celebrate the successful march. He "interviewed" seven Negro children at the party. "The kids that I talked to are involved in the same struggle as their parents," he said. "There is no delinquency among the Negro children in Selma now. They are proud and happy in what they're doing."



John Zippert
Debating Himself

John Zippert, SG President, spoke of the indignities which Negroes are exposed to in Selma. "When James Lee Jackson was killed, it was treated as just another death. When James Reeb was killed it was a national crime," he said. Zippert said he is still debating with himself whether students at the College can do more to aid the struggle by working for civil rights in New York or in the South.

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OBSERVATION POST

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Editorial decisions are determined by majority vote of the Managing Board and Nancy Ehrlich and Harvey Weinberg.

OBSERVATION POST is published and edited by students of the City College.

College To Get \$25,000 Grant

The College will receive \$25,000 "to encourage excellence in scientific and technological education," it was announced Friday.

The grant from the New York State Science and Technology Foundation, will be used to bring distinguished professors to the College.

The College was recommended by the Foundation's directors, and was approved by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller.

An additional \$39,600 was awarded to eleven other colleges in New York State.

LETTERS

ELECT WEBER

To the Editor:

Of the many candidates running in last week's Student Government by-election, Linda Weber '66 was the most qualified and competent. Linda has: attended most Student Council meetings this term, participated extensively in SG's free tuition campaign particularly the vigil at Governor Rockefeller's Office, aided in planning the SG Campus Affairs program to analyze the events at Berkeley and organized the bus of City College students who joined the March on Montgomery. Linda's suggestion to increase library hours during

finals is just a small example of her concern for increasing student participation in decision making at the College.

Juniors have an opportunity to elect an excellent representative in Linda Weber in today's run-off election for a Student Council seat in the Class of 1966.

Sincerely,
John Zippert
SG President

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COLLEGE BOWL

Has Come — 326F — April 8, 12-2

KIBITZERS ENCOURAGED.

Join The Protest

American aggression in Vietnam grows more ominous each week. A gradual escalation in weapons, including the introduction of non-lethal gas, and in the scope of operations with bombing right up to China's border, has been effected without any regard for the American people. A recent Harris Poll showed that more than eighty per cent of the American people prefer a negotiated peace to a continuation of hostilities.

Perhaps scanty press coverage can be blamed for the lack of mass action to protest our intervention in the Vietnamese people's fight for independence. Branding the protest demonstrations as Communist-inspired has kept some people away, but as Paul Krassner has said:

"... when we call concentration camps *strategic hamlets*; when we call torturers *counter-insurgency experts*; when we call unwarranted provocations *military probes*; when we call innocent Vietnamese kids *war casualties* — then it really doesn't make any difference any more what you call the people who protest. The United States is spending two million dollars a day there to make noble that which is ignoble; what's one more self-deception?"

Students at the College are finally being offered the chance to participate in organized protests against the war in Vietnam and the lack of information provided the American public by President Johnson. Plans are being formulated for a "teach-in" to be held next Monday night in the Grand Ballroom. Patterned after similar demonstrations at Columbia and Michigan State Universities, the "teach-in" will consist of lectures on Vietnam by several members of the faculty followed by a question period.

The "teach-in" will last through the night in an attempt to arouse student and faculty interest in the war.

A march on Washington to protest the war in Vietnam is planned for Saturday, April 17. Thousands of students from across the country are expected to picket the White House, march down the Mall to the Capitol Building to present a statement to Congress, and hear several speakers, including Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska. Every student must make his stand known now — he must either sign up for the trip, or be identified with the forces advocating American aggression in Vietnam. The trip is scheduled for the second day of Spring vacation, so schoolwork cannot be used as an excuse. Fare is only six dollars for a round trip bus leaving from the College. We urge each student to sign up for the trip immediately in Room 412 Finley or the OP office.

Student Council should support this trip whole-heartedly, and do all it can to assist in registration of students for the demonstration. We hope the faculty and the administration will join the students and send a delegation to Washington on the College buses.

The students of the College must demonstrate that they no longer will tolerate a government policy which callously disregards the wishes of the American people in pursuing a goal which can only lead to disaster.

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


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
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One of the tragedies of the War in Vietnam for Americans is that we have been largely uninformed about the war. The tragic consequences of this condition are evident in the emotional, unreasoned way that the subject of our involvement and purpose in Vietnam is discussed. This lack of information is especially un-

An OP Editorial

fortunate and inappropriate in an institution of higher learning whose purpose it is to educate the student and prepare him for a responsible

and conscious role in society. It is in the hope of helping the student to a better comprehension and understanding of the issues involved in the Vietnamese War that *Observation Post* is publishing this special supplement. We welcome the reaction of all students as to the success of this endeavor.

OBSERVATION POST

OP VIETNAM SUPPLEMENT

TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1965

CITY COLLEGE

We Must — (1) 'Bug Out' (2) Negotiate (3) Fight

A military commentator argues for greater use of our power in Vietnam: 'We must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat.'

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

What should we do — "bug out" or fight? Should we be "Hawks" or "Doves"? Or is there a third choice — negotiations now?

Recent events in Vietnam indicate that "the war that is not a war" has reached a crossroads. Washington's policy of the past four years, based on the polite fiction that we were not fighting a war but merely helping the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong insurgents within their own territory, has reached a point of no return.

Compromise and consensus — perhaps applicable to some of the nation's great domestic problems — cannot be guideposts to foreign policy. There must be a clear-cut and courageous decision. And though in Vietnam we face the hard problem of risking much to gain little, the risk must be taken: we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. We must use what it takes to win.

Our policy should not be "unconditional surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal of victory should be the defeat of Communist attempts to conquer South Vietnam and extend their control deep into Southeast Asia.

The reasons we must fight for Vietnam have little to do with making Saigon safe for "democracy" or "freedom." There has been far too much cant on this point; far too much effort devoted to trying to establish a politically legitimate South Vietnamese Government after our own image. Nor does it do much good to argue the past, debating whether or not we should have become involved in Vietnam in the first place. The facts are that Communist expansionism in Asia has been consistent, related and progressive, that the end of the Korean war, without a simultaneous settlement in Vietnam, gave Peking and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh the opportunity in Southeast Asia they have so well exploited.

The psychological and political consequences of a United States defeat in Vietnam, a United States withdrawal, or a negotiated

HANSON W. BALDWIN has been *The Times* military editor for several years. This article is reprinted with permission of *The New York Times*.


peace likely to lead to a Communist take-over, would be disastrous in much of Asia. It would undermine Thailand (already openly threatened by Peking), Laos (even now half-conquered by Communism), Malaya, the Philippines (with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma, India, Japan and even Taiwan, Okinawa and Australia.

Despite the admitted importance of South Vietnam to the United States global position, the current breed of neo-isolationists and the "Doves" who believe we must cut our losses and get out,

(Continued on Page S4)



South Vietnam soldier uses dagger butt on Vietnamese farmer who gave wrong information about the Viet Cong to government troops. After knocking the farmer down, the soldier proceeded to work him over.



Political Clubs' Positions On War In Vietnam Vary from Strong Defense to Condemnation

The position of the College's political clubs on the War in Vietnam runs the gamut from outright condemnation to staunch defense of the Administration's position.

On the one hand are the Young Conservatives, who believe that "the battle in Viet Nam is merely part of a World-wide struggle which has been telescoped into that beleaguered country;" while organizations such as the Dubois Club, May 2nd Movement, Youth against War and Fascism, and Progressive Labor stand opposed to the war and favor the withdrawal of United States troops.

Somewhere in between are the Young Democrats who, while defending the necessity of our presence in Vietnam, declare that "negotiations" for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam should begin immediately.

The troops in Vietnam were termed murderers by the May 2nd Movement, which believes that "we too are the victims of this war." "On the north campus we are trained to refine the techniques of killing and on south campus, to justify them," continued the statement of the May 2nd Movement. Declaring that "withdrawal cannot serve either

the cause of peace or freedom," the Young Conservative Club went on to assert that the War in Vietnam must be carried to "a victorious conclusion."

The Young Democrats felt that the courage of the US was being tested in Vietnam and that the issue was one of U.S. security and "not entirely one of morality."

The W.E.B. DuBois Club, however, declared that an immediate cease fire, a reconvening of the Geneva Conference and the withdrawal of U.S. troops was the only course which America could follow in the "dirty" Vietnamese War. It was felt by the DuBois Club that the money which the U.S. was spending each day in Vietnam could help substantially to alleviate the conditions of poverty in America instead.

Countering the position taken by the Young Conservative Club that "positive action with respect to Communist China" ranging from blockade to invasion must be taken soon, was the declaration by Youth Against War and Fascism that the U.S. was the sole prosecutor of the "dirty" war.

Our Position In Vietnam 'Worse Than Fanaticism'

By ABRAHAM EDEL

The philosopher George Santayana has defined fanaticism as redoubling one's efforts when one has forgotten one's aim. The position of the United States in Vietnam is even worse than that, for we have not even had a clear aim in sight, and what is more, the cost of our blundering is being paid in greatest part by the people of Vietnam. We do, of course, have numerous slogans of justification, and it is the purpose of these remarks to consider them. But think first of the impact of our policy, in at least three important respects:

We are escalating a war into

ABRAHAM EDEL is a Professor of Philosophy at the College.

what can readily become a one-way streets to nuclear disaster.

We have proceeded unilaterally, ignoring our commitments under the United Nations in a way which hurts its authority for maintaining peace.

We are becoming, in the minds of the people of Asia, the major symbol of white domination, so that if we continue we shall reap the whirlwind for ourselves and our children.

How can we possibly justify such a policy in moral and social terms?

It is said that it is too late to turn back. But it is never too late to right a wrong rather than do a double wrong. We can leave to authoritarian systems the claim of infallibility or making a major policy out of saving face. A democratic outlook only wins respect by placing peace ahead of pride.

It is said that we are too deeply committed to draw back. But to whom are we committed? Not to the people of South Vietnam, for it is clear to most close observers of the scene that the Viet Cong have at present the overwhelming support of the people and would easily win a free election. Nor can our commitment be to an ever-changing government, changing coup by coup. It must then be to ourselves. Either we have a reasonable ground that can bear the light of day, or we have none.

It is said that we are defending freedom. Certainly not in Vietnam, where we have supported a tyrannical dictatorship over the people. This slogan is wearing thin: even Hanson Baldwin in defending our policy says that there has been "far too much cant" on the point of making Saigon safe for "democracy" or "freedom."

It is said that we have to draw a line somewhere as the last point at which we will not yield but fight, for we have learned from Hitler that appeasement does not pay. But, as Professor Walter Kaufmann pointed out in a letter to the *Times* dated March 18, 1965, "While our Government sees its Asian enemies as Hitler's heirs, some of the rest of the world considers American policy in Vietnam fascist." He quotes a report of South Vietnamese planes bombing a village as reprisals for shooting at an observation plane, with the resultant death of 45 villagers including 37 school children, and he reminds

(Continued on Page S4)

An Investigation Into The Vietnamese

This document was compiled and edited by four students from the College: Matthew Berkelhammer, Arthur Kopecky, Eric Shtob and Eric Shutz. Comments on its contents and the views which it expressed can be forwarded to the authors through the Observation Post.

If the United States pursues its present policy, "... I see no end to the war in South Vietnam but a full-fledged Asian war in the years ahead. And I see no end to a full-fledged Asian war but a world war."—Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.) (*Congressional Record*, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 21366).

The ominous and portentous nature of this prediction is highlighted by the fact that on February 7, 1965, United States military forces attacked North Vietnam, bombing and strafing victory near Dong-hoi. These attacks have been extended further north and intensified since then. In conjunction with these attacks, the evacuation of about 1,800 dependents of United States military and civilian personnel stationed in South Vietnam was ordered by President Johnson. Furthermore, an air defense battalion, equipped with Hawk ground-to-air missiles was ordered into the Danang area. These are compelling indications that our government is seriously considering intensifying and expanding its war effort. The danger to world peace is further aggravated by the promises of assistance to North Vietnam by both the Soviet Union and Communist China in the event that any nation encroaches upon North Vietnam's territory. Despite the fact that members of our Administration have repeatedly declared that they "seek no wider war," the danger that this conflict will escalate into a more general, or even a world war, is indubitably present, as well as 'frighteningly' imminent.

It is in light of these circumstances that United States policy in Vietnam, as well as the premises upon which it is based, must be subjected to a critical and objective examination.

United States participation in the South Vietnamese war is based on the premise that the operations of the Vietcong (a term used to identify any and all persons fighting against the present Saigon government and to falsely imply that they are all Communists) are being "ordered and directed and masterminded from Hanoi" (Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in a news conference, February 7, 1965.)

The North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese are furthermore alleged to be the principal trainers of Vietcong troops and the principal suppliers of weapons to them. It is supposed that the whole war effort of the Vietcong against the Saigon government lacks the support of the majority of the people of South Vietnam and is being sustained only by the actions of outside infiltrators, agitators, terrorizers, trainers, and suppliers.

This has been the Administration's position since 1954 and its reason for participation in the war. It is apparent, however, that a tremendous quantity of information exists which contradicts this position and indicates that the war is, in fact, an immensely popular civil war against the existing government and is not directed, supplied, or perpetrated by any outside force.

1) David Halberstam, *N.Y. Times*, March 6, 1964:

"The war is largely a conflict of Southerners fought in the Southern land. No capture of North Vietnamese has come to light and it is generally believed that most Vietcong weapons have been seized from the South Vietnamese forces."

2) *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1963, interviewing U.S. forces commander, General Paul D. Harkins:

"Harkins said the guerrillas obviously are not being reinforced or supplied systematically from North Vietnam, China, or any place else. He said they apparently

depend for their weapons primarily upon whatever they may capture. Many of their weapons, he said, are homemade.

3) Richard Starnes wrote in the *New York World Telegram* of January 4, 1965:

"There is not one shred of credible evidence that the bulk of munitions used by the Vietcong originate in the north. At the outset, the Vietcong used crude homemade weapons, but the bulk of their arms now are captured or otherwise acquired from the woefully inept defenders of South Vietnam."

4) Senator Church (D., Idaho):

"Basically, the Vietcong consists of South Vietnamese; the bulk of their weaponry is captured, and they have the capability of maintaining their attacks, independent of North Vietnam. Therefore, it's folly to think that by extending the



war northward, there is a way out for U.S." (Senator Frank Church, interviewed in *Ramparts*, Jan.-Feb., 1965, P.R.)

5) Walter Lippman, *Washington Post*, April 21, 1964:

"The truth, which is being obscured for the American people, is that the Saigon government has the allegiance of probably no more than 30% of the people and controls (even in daylight) not much more than a quarter of the territory."

6) In his book *Guerrillas in the 1950's*, Peter Paret states that the essence of guerrilla war is mass popular support. Without this it has no prospect of success or even serious impact. "Only one side fights from an extensive and well organized popular base and in most places that is not our side. (Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, by Praeger, 1962.)

7) *U.S. News and World Report*, June 1, 1964, states that that most reported North Vietnamese agents are South Vietnamese recruited "from 100,000 South Vietnamese who chose to leave their homes and join the Communists in North Vietnam."

8) Senator Wayne Morse:

"Mr. President, I've been briefed many times, as have the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee; and all this time witness after witness from the State Department and from the Pentagon have admitted under examination that they had no evidence of any foreign troops in South Vietnam from North Vietnam, Red China, Cambodia, or anywhere else." — (*Congressional Record*, Aug. 5, 1964, p. 17554.)

The South Vietnamese government receives more aid per capita than any other country to which we give aid. To date we have given some 5½ billion dollars to defeat "Communists" in that country.

In the *New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1965, Arnold H. Lubasch states:

"Washington is pouring almost 2 million dollars a day into South Vietnam, where the American military force has been increased to 23,000 men. More than 375 Americans have died there, more than 262, in combat . . . since the beginning of 1961."

Homer Bigart of the *New York Times* gives this comparison of the forces:

"In 1963 the Republic of South Vietnam will put well-equipped forces — totaling more than 350,000 men against 25,000 guerrillas who have no artillery, no anti-aircraft, no air power, no trucks, no jeeps, no prime movers, and only basic infantry weapons. Also, South Vietnamese government forces . . . will have more helicopters, more personnel carriers and other gadgets to enhance mobility."

Yet the Vietcong has been spectacularly successful in winning the war against a government which now controls little more than Saigon. That we are losing and that the situation is continually deteriorating is uncontested. How can such a massive, well-equipped army be losing?

It seems that the only explanation for

this is that the Vietcong has the active support and cooperation of the South Vietnamese people, that it is the people who are doing the fighting; that, in effect, they are the Vietcong.

Another striking indication of the lack of support for the war being fought by the South Vietnamese government is the conduct of the army. It is clear that the South Vietnamese Army is not a loyal fighting force dedicated to saving the country from invasion.

Beverly Deepe, in *The Sunday Tribune*, May 24, 1964, reports:

"During a recent month, the government issued a draft call for 20,000 men — but only 1,500 showed up . . . According to American advisors in the province, the Communists are so popular they're running out of recruit forms . . . One American provincial representative said 'By the time they are ready to go into the Army they are already with Vietcong or in hiding' . . . An estimated 7% of the Armed Forces are Communist Vietcong agents or sympathizers, with the figure running as high as 20% in some units. In one known case, an entire elite unit defected the night before its graduation exercise. A directive dated May 9, 1964, signed by Brigadier General Sternberg, is reported to say that 'Decreasing WVNAR (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) strength continues to be the major problem facing the GVM (Government of Vietnam) . . .'

An often noted indication of the fact that Vietnamese soldiers are not fighting shoulder to shoulder with the "American advisors" is the lack of morale and will to fight on the part of the South Vietnamese Government's forces.

U.S. News and World Report, May 4, 1964, published the letters of a United States officer, Captain Jerry Shank, who states:

"We do everything. The only reason they (the Vietnamese pilots) are on board is in case we crash there is an American 'advisor' and one Vietnamese 'student.' They're stupid ignorant sacrificial lams . . ."

U. S. News and World Report, June 1, 1964, sums up the situation:

"The South Vietnamese Army still gives the impression that it does not know what it is fighting for."

South Vietnam reportedly has a total of some 612,000 (*N. Y. Post*, Dec. 9, 1964) men in the armed forces. Yet this massive army is losing the war. Capt. Holland of the U.S. Army indicates why the army is so large and why it is so unsuccessful in a letter to his wife, Feb. 4, 1965: "See all that barbed wire around this hill? That is there to keep the soldiers on this hill more than to keep the Vietcong off." (*The National Guardian*, Feb. 20, 1965, p. 8). Capt. Holland died less than two weeks later. *AP* reported, when the Vietnamese soldiers with whom he was stationed surrendered him and three other Americans to the Vietcong.

This is not an army fighting for its country's freedom; when it is stated that this is McNamara's war, nothing could be more correct. The great majority of the Vietnamese people want nothing to do with the war. It is interesting to note that the army that has the spirit, has the enthusiasm and has the will, is the Vietcong. All news sources agree with *U. S. News and World Report*, June 1, 1964, when it reports that the "courage and fighting ability of the Vietcong Communist regulars are unquestioned here . . . Americans in the field marvel at the ability of the Communist guerrillas to keep fighting under heavy bombardment . . ."

A SHORT HISTORY

To understand why a large majority of the people of South Vietnam support the National Liberation Front, and why they are fighting so strongly against the Saigon government and its American "advisors," a brief summary of historical developments in Southeast Asia is necessary.

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By the summer of 1945 due to the success of the Vietminh and the defeat of Japan by the Allies, the Japanese surrendered to Ho's forces. On September 2, he proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. But at the Potsdam Conference the Allies gave Indochina back to France. Between autumn 1945 and December 1946, France reconquered Vietnam. The Vietminh took to the jungles to begin the last phase of its war against the French. By 1954 the war had become immensely popular and the Vietminh was able to defeat France's 400,000 soldiers.

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The United States intervened directly in Vietnam after the Agreement after paying 78 per cent of the French costs in the Indochina war (*New York Times*, July 4, 1954) and placed Ngo Dinh Diem in power in the south. Buttressed by U.S. military force he refused to hold elections, perhaps because as former President Eisenhower stated on page 371 of "Mandate for Change": "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time

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The presence of American troops and the repressive policies of Ngo Dinh Diem prompted in 1960 the formation of the National Liberation Front, a coalition of anti-Saigon forces, to act as the political arm of the South Vietnamese guerrillas, the so-called Vietcong.

The main function of the Diem government until it was overthrown in 1963, had been the fighting of the Vietcong. This policy was carried on by the succeeding eight governments. During this period the resistance to Saigon and the United States grew steadily. Today it has all the characteristics of the popular movement which led to the defeat of nearly one-half million French troops.

It is in the history of this period that the reasons for the present civil war are to be found.

1. In 1955 Diem started a program of repression against anti-French resistance fighters remaining in the South, all of whom were suspected of being Communist.

In a Diem directive of 1955 illegal resistors were defined as those who had taken up arms against the "legal" government in the days of the French colonial occupation, (Wilfred G. Burchett, *The Furtive War*, New York, International Publishers, 1959, p. 60).

Almost the entire population of South Vietnam, however, had participated in the war against the French.

2. *U.S. News and World Report*, March 23, 1964, states:

"The Vietminh won the war against the French largely because they had the support of the rural population." They comment further: "The anti-French forces . . . reached as high as 500,000."

3. The extent of the repressive campaign and the involvement of coercion were quite wide. A Diem government document *Five Years of Government Achievement* (1959) lists eight major "Denounce Communists campaigns" since 1955. These angered practically the whole population.

Planes and artillery were used against villages where the inhabitants were "uncooperative."

The tactics which Diem (and now Khanh) used after the renewal of guerrilla fighting had all the characteristics of anti-guerrilla warfare. Since guerrilla success depends upon popular support, the main tactic in anti-guerrilla warfare is to prevent contact between peasants and guerrillas. This has been attempted through the strategic hamlet program, i.e. relocation of masses of the population into fortified villages where they can be watched by South Vietnamese government forces. Another tactic has been the destruction of peasant food supplies, to avoid their falling into the hands of guerrillas.

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8. This policy only increased the already large support that the Vietcong had among the peasants.

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"And then, of course, they [the peasants] are turned into hard core Communists when the Vietnamese Air Force bombs and strafes their villages because they deserted their government hamlets to go back to Vietcong territory."

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12. Beverly Déepe, in the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 29, 1964, reports that in Vietnam all branches of government and the press are concentrated in the hands of a small ruling minority. Opposition is bought off or suppressed."

13. An article which strikingly shows the popularity of the Communist cause is one from the *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1964:

In an article entitled "Vietcong fighters say they are glad they joined guerrillas," it is said that ". . . the Vietcong guerrillas talk like local people about simple things." A notice reports: "So I thought maybe the Liberation Front people were the ones who were right . . . Now I know they are."

The reported says he was welcomed in Communist held areas. "They all said they were natives of the hamlet they were guarding. All spoke Vietnamese with the local accent."

Asked if they had contact with North Vietnamese officers, they answered, "No."

CONCLUSION

The United States has no legitimate basis for fighting in South Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam is primarily a civil war, which is being fought between the people of South Vietnam and the Saigon government. This government exists only by virtue of United States money, equipment and troops. It is despised by the people of the country because it has been, since its inception in 1954, undemocratic and repressive.

There is no documentation of the alleged presence of any foreign troops (other than those of the United States) in South Vietnam. The Vietcong are not directed or supplied by Hanoi, Peking, or any other source. The National Liberation Front is, in fact, an indigenous movement that has the support of the great majority of the people of South Vietnam. The guerrilla fighters have proved continually successful although they have been battling against a tremendous army has overwhelming weaponry.

The Saigon government would quickly fall to the National Liberation Front forces if the United States withdrew the massive military and economic aid that keeps Saigon in power. Because of its role in South Vietnam the United States is directly responsible for the present very brutal war. The deaths of Vietnamese every week, the napalm bombings of native villages, the defoliation of forests and the destruction of crops and livestock, the forcible herding of people into "strategic hamlets," the torture of political and military prisoners, the disruption of millions of lives, is a result of United States policy.

Participation by the United States in the war is illegal both in terms of national and international law. The Congress of the United States has never officially declared war, and American intervention

in Vietnam is in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

The United States war effort is failing. The number of defections from the South Vietnamese army is huge. Already well over half of the territory of South Vietnam is controlled by the National Liberation Front. The people of South Vietnam are determined to rid their country of foreigners and hold national elections.

It is ironic that the very nations in South East Asia that the U. S. claims to be delivering from the "menace of Communism" have become alienated from the U. S. because of its policies in Vietnam. Prime Ministers Shastri of India and General Ne Win of Burma have urged a negotiated settlement and an end to the war. During the period of U. S. intervention in Indochina, Indonesia has become strongly anti-American. Cambodia has broken relations with the United States specifically over the issue of South Vietnam, and now, more than ever, urges the withdrawal of U. S. troops. Prime Minister Sato of Japan seems to have expressed the feeling prevalent in Asia by saying that the United States should leave Asia's problems to the Asians.

The continuation of the war by the United States greatly increases international tensions, and, especially since the recent bombings of North Vietnam and the resultant possibility of escalation, is an immediate threat to East-West relations and world peace.

The framework for the United States' present Asian policy was formed largely by John Foster Dulles during the McCarthy era, when, for a while, there was not one senior advisor on East Asian affairs in the State Department. Because of the fear, distrust, and hatred of that period, the policy was grounded more in myth than in fact.

Since that time the facts about the war in Vietnam have been suppressed and distorted by the United States government and many of the major newspapers and news services. Reporters such as David Halberstam and Homer Bigart of the *New York Times*, who have sought the truth and written frankly and objectively about the situation in Vietnam, have been recalled. One has only to remember how the United States government and the newspapers convinced the public up until 1962 that U. S. military men were in Vietnam solely as advisors. However, the realization that these military men were engaged in combat became so blatantly apparent by 1962 that the falsehood was officially retracted. But it had been believed by a majority of the American people. The United States government is still attempting to delude the American people by distorting the news from Vietnam.

And in so far as the responsibility for the tragedy in Vietnam lies with the American government, it lies with the American people. The United States is preventing a cease fire and an end to the war. If it were not for the presence of the U. S. a negotiated settlement under international supervision, which would provide for general elections, would take place. This is not only the program requested by the National Liberation Front, but it is the settlement advocated by many world leaders. This would restore to Vietnam a government based upon the principles of democracy and self-determination.

We have been too docile in accepting the falsehoods and distortions that have been presented to us. William Lederer's characterization of Americans as a "nation of sheep," unfortunately, is too often true. In an age when international problems have the greatest consequences for the lives of thousands and millions of people, we seem to take no notice of world events. We are being led and we do not lift our heads. Our greatest crime is that we do not care.

An Investigation Into The Vietnamese

This document was compiled and edited by four students from the College: Matthew Berkelhammer, Arthur Kopecky, Eric Shtob and Eric Shutz. Comments on its contents and the views which it expressed can be forwarded to the authors through the Observation Post.

If the United States pursues its present policy, "... I see no end to the war in South Vietnam but a full-fledged Asian war in the years ahead. And I see no end to a full-fledged Asian war but a world war."—Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.) (Congressional Record, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 21366).

The ominous and portentous nature of this prediction is highlighted by the fact that on February 7, 1965, United States military forces attacked North Vietnam, bombing and strafing victory near Dong-hoi. These attacks have been extended further north and intensified since then. In conjunction with these attacks, the evacuation of about 1,800 dependents of United States military and civilian personnel stationed in South Vietnam was ordered by President Johnson. Furthermore, an air defense battalion, equipped with Hawk ground-to-air missiles was ordered into the Danang area. These are compelling indications that our government is seriously considering intensifying and expanding its war effort. The danger to world peace is further aggravated by the promises of assistance to North Vietnam by both the Soviet Union and Communist China in the event that any nation encroaches upon North Vietnam's territory. Despite the fact that members of our Administration have repeatedly declared that they "seek no wider war," the danger that this conflict will escalate into a more general, or even a world war, is indubitably present, as well as frighteningly imminent.

It is in light of these circumstances that United States policy in Vietnam, as well as the premises upon which it is based, must be subjected to a critical and objective examination.

United States participation in the South Vietnamese war is based on the premise that the operations of the Vietcong (a term used to identify any and all persons fighting against the present Saigon government and to falsely imply that they are all Communists) are being "ordered and directed and masterminded from Hanoi" (Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in a news conference, February 7, 1965.)

The North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese are furthermore alleged to be the principal trainers of Vietcong troops and the principal suppliers of weapons to them. It is supposed that the whole war effort of the Vietcong against the Saigon government lacks the support of the majority of the people of South Vietnam and is being sustained only by the actions of outside infiltrators, agitators, terrorizers, trainers, and suppliers.

This has been the Administration's position since 1954 and its reason for participation in the war. It is apparent, however, that a tremendous quantity of information exists which contradicts this position and indicates that the war is, in fact, an immensely popular civil war against the existing government and is not directed, supplied, or perpetrated by any outside force.

1) David Halberstam, *N.Y. Times*, March 6, 1964:

"The war is largely a conflict of Southerners fought in the Southern land. No capture of North Vietnamese has come to light and it is generally believed that most Vietcong weapons have been seized from the South Vietnamese forces."

2) *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1963, interviewing U.S. forces commander, General Paul D. Harkins:

"Harkins said the guerrillas obviously are not being reinforced or supplied systematically from North Vietnam, China, or any place else. He said they apparently

depend for their weapons primarily upon whatever they may capture. Many of their weapons, he said, are homemade.

3) Richard Starnes wrote in the *New York World Telegram* of January 4, 1965:

"There is not one shred of credible evidence that the bulk of munitions used by the Vietcong originate in the north. At the outset, the Vietcong used crude homemade weapons, but the bulk of their arms now are captured or otherwise acquired from the woefully inept defenders of South Vietnam."

4) Senator Church (D., Idaho):
"Basically, the Vietcong consists of South Vietnamese; the bulk of their weaponry is captured, and they have the capability of maintaining their attacks, independent of North Vietnam. Therefore, it's folly to think that by extending the



war northward, there is a way out for U.S." (Senator Frank Church, interviewed in *Ramparts*, Jan.-Feb., 1965, P.R.)

5) Walter Lippman, *Washington Post*, April 21, 1964:

"The truth, which is being obscured for the American people, is that the Saigon government has the allegiance of probably no more than 30% of the people and controls (even in daylight) not much more than a quarter of the territory."

6) In his book *Guerrillas in the 1950's*, Peter Paret states that the essence of guerrilla war is mass popular support. Without this it has no prospect of success or even serious impact. "Only one side fights from an extensive and well organized popular base and in most places that is not our side. (Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, by Praeger, 1962.)

7) *U.S. News and World Report*, June 1, 1964, states that that most reported North Vietnamese agents are South Vietnamese recruited "from 100,000 South Vietnamese who chose to leave their homes and join the Communists in North Vietnam."

8) Senator Wayne Morse:
"Mr. President, I've been briefed many times, as have the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee; and all this time witness after witness from the State Department and from the Pentagon have admitted under examination that they had no evidence of any foreign troops in South Vietnam from North Vietnam, Red China, Cambodia, or anywhere else." — (Congressional Record, Aug. 5, 1964, p. 17554.)

The South Vietnamese government receives more aid per capita than any other country to which we give aid. To date we have given some 5½ billion dollars to defeat "Communists" in that country.

In the *New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1965, Arnold H. Lubasch states:

"Washington is pouring almost 2 million dollars a day into South Vietnam, where the American military force has been increased to 23,000 men. More than 375 Americans have died there, more than 262, in combat . . . since the beginning of 1961."

Homer Bigart of the *New York Times* gives this comparison of the forces:

"In 1963 the Republic of South Vietnam will put well-equipped forces — totaling more than 350,000 men against 25,000 guerrillas who have no artillery, no anti-aircraft, no air power, no trucks, no jeeps, no prime movers, and only basic infantry weapons. Also, South Vietnamese government forces . . . will have more helicopters, more personnel carriers and other gadgets to enhance mobility."

Yet the Vietcong has been spectacularly successful in winning the war against a government which now controls little more than Saigon. That we are losing and that the situation is continually deteriorating is uncontested. How can such a massive, well-equipped army be losing?

It seems that the only explanation for

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this is that the Vietcong has the active support and cooperation of the South Vietnamese people, that it is the people who are doing the fighting; that, in effect, they are the Vietcong.

Another striking indication of the lack of support for the war being fought by the South Vietnamese government is the conduct of the army. It is clear that the South Vietnamese Army is not a loyal fighting force dedicated to saving the country from invasion.

Beverly Deepe, in *The Sunday Tribune*, May 24, 1964, reports:

"During a recent month, the government issued a draft call for 20,000 men — but only 1,500 showed up . . . According to American advisors in the province, the Communists are so popular they're running out of recruit forms . . . One American provincial representative said 'By the time they are ready to go into the Army they are already with Vietcong or in hiding' . . . An estimated 7% of the Armed Forces are Communist Vietcong agents or sympathizers, with the figure running as high as 20% in some units. In one known case, an entire elite unit defected the night before its graduation exercise. A directive dated May 9, 1964, signed by Brigadier General Sternberg, is reported to say that 'Decreasing WVNAR (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) strength continues to be the major problem facing the GVM (Government of Vietnam) . . ."

An often noted indication of the fact that Vietnamese soldiers are not fighting shoulder to shoulder with the "American advisors" is the lack of morale and will to fight on the part of the South Vietnamese Government's forces.

U.S. News and World Report, May 4, 1964, published the letters of a United States officer, Captain Jerry Shank who states:

"We do everything. The only reason they (the Vietnamese pilots) are on board is in case we crash there is an American 'advisor' and one Vietnamese 'student.' They're stupid ignorant sacrificial lams . . ."

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12. Beverly Déepe, in the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 29, 1964, reports that in Vietnam all branches of government and the press are concentrated in the hands of a small ruling minority. Opposition is bought off or suppressed."

13. An article which strikingly shows the popularity of the Communist cause is one from the *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1964:

In an article entitled "Vietcong fighters say they are glad they joined guerrillas," it is said that ". . . the Vietcong guerrillas talk like local people about simple things." A notice reports: "So I thought maybe the Liberation Front people were the ones who were right . . . Now I know they are."

The reported says he was welcomed in Communist held areas. "They all said they were natives of the hamlet, they were guarding. All spoke Vietnamese with the local accent."

Asked if they had contact with North Vietnamese officers, they answered, "No."

CONCLUSION

The United States has no legitimate basis for fighting in South Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam is primarily a civil war, which is being fought between the people of South Vietnam and the Saigon government. This government exists only by virtue of United States money, equipment and troops. It is despised by the people of the country because it has been, since its inception in 1954, undemocratic and repressive.

There is no documentation of the alleged presence of any foreign troops (other than those of the United States) in South Vietnam. The Vietcong are not directed or supplied by Hanoi, Peking, or any other source. The National Liberation Front is, in fact, an indigenous movement that has the support of the great majority of the people of South Vietnam. The guerrilla fighters have proved continually successful although they have been battling against a tremendous army has overwhelming weaponry.

The Saigon government would quickly fall to the National Liberation Front forces if the United States withdrew the massive military and economic aid that keeps Saigon in power. Because of its role in South Vietnam the United States is directly responsible for the present very brutal war. The deaths of Vietnamese every week, the napalm bombings of native villages, the defoliation of forests and the destruction of crops and livestock, the forcible herding of people into "strategic hamlets," the torture of political and military prisoners, the disruption of millions of lives, is a result of United States policy.

Participation by the United States in the war is illegal both in terms of national and international law. The Congress of the United States has never officially declared war, and American intervention

in Vietnam is in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

The United States war effort is failing. The number of defections from the South Vietnamese army is huge. Already well over half of the territory of South Vietnam is controlled by the National Liberation Front. The people of South Vietnam are determined to rid their country of foreigners and hold national elections.

It is ironic that the very nations in South East Asia that the U. S. claims to be delivering from the "menace of Communism" have become alienated from the U. S. because of its policies in Vietnam. Prime Ministers Shastri of India and General Ne Win of Burma have urged a negotiated settlement and an end to the war. During the period of U. S. intervention in Indochina, Indonesia has become strongly anti-American. Cambodia has broken relations with the United States specifically over the issue of South Vietnam, and now, more than ever, urges the withdrawal of U. S. troops. Prime Minister Sato of Japan seems to have expressed the feeling prevalent in Asia by saying that the United States should leave Asia's problems to the Asians.

The continuation of the war by the United States greatly increases international tensions, and, especially since the recent bombings of North Vietnam and the resultant possibility of escalation, is an immediate threat to East-West relations and world peace.

The framework for the United States' present Asian policy was formed largely by John Foster Dulles during the McCarthy era, when, for a while, there was not one senior advisor on East Asian affairs in the State Department. Because of the fear, distrust, and hatred of that period, the policy was grounded more in myth than in fact.

Since that time the facts about the war in Vietnam have been suppressed and distorted by the United States government and many of the major newspapers and news services. Reporters such as David Halberstam and Homer Bigart of the *New York Times*, who have sought the truth and written frankly and objectively about the situation in Vietnam, have been recalled. One has only to remember how the United States government and the newspapers convinced the public up until 1962 that U. S. military men were in Vietnam solely as advisors. However, the realization that these military men were engaged in combat became so blatantly apparent by 1962 that the falsehood was officially retracted. But it had been believed by a majority of the American people. The United States government is still attempting to delude the American people by distorting the news from Vietnam.

And in so far as the responsibility for the tragedy in Vietnam lies with the American government, it lies with the American people. The United States is preventing a cease fire and an end to the war. If it were not for the presence of the U. S. a negotiated settlement under international supervision, which would provide for general elections, would take place. This is not only the program requested by the National Liberation Front, but it is the settlement advocated by many world leaders. This would restore to Vietnam a government based upon the principles of democracy and self-determination.

We have been too docile in accepting the falsehoods and distortions that have been presented to us. William Lederer's characterization of Americans as a "nation of sheep," unfortunately, is too often true. In an age when international problems have the greatest consequences for the lives of thousands and millions of people, we seem to take no notice of world events. We are being led and we do not lift our heads. Our greatest crime is that we do not care.

The United States Must Make A Choice

(Continued from Page S1)
advance many arguments against deeper involvement and in favor of withdrawal.

Most of the arguments represent the voices of defeat and despair, caution and fear.

"Why not negotiate now?"

Any negotiations opened now would lead from weakness, not strength. If we want to negotiate—and not to surrender—we shall have to raise our ante considerably. And "meaningful" negotiations are "meaningful" to the Communists only if they are faced with superior power and a position of strength.

"Continued fighting or expanded U.S. involvement will mean higher U.S. casualties and greater risks of broadening the war."

Of course. You cannot win a war without spilling blood. We must pay the price of power. Risks are unavoidable in any foreign policy worthy of its name. The question is not whether there will be risks, but the degree of risk. For against the perils of action must be weighed the perils of inaction. Political and military history clearly reveal that compromise, hesitancy or appeasement merely lead to ultimate disaster. In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater the price we shall have to pay for even partial victory (as we are now discovering), and the more restricted our choice of options.

"We have no moral right to be in Vietnam, or to attack North Vietnam."

Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North Vietnam have the right to support the civil war in the South. Our involvement was a response to Communist aggression. Since the beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied and directed the Vietcong insurgency. We were invited by the South Vietnamese Government to come to its aid. A high moral purpose is an essential element of our foreign policy but we can be left with no purpose—moral or otherwise—if we are conquered by the doctrine that the ends justify the means. If we are inhibited from action by Hamlet-like indecision over legalistic concepts of international law, we shall lose the world.

What should be done? First and foremost, we must recognize as a Government and as a people that we are fighting a war in Vietnam, and not merely "advising" how to fight one. Such a recognition would awaken a greater sense of national and military determination, inspire a Presidential and Congressional enunciation of purpose, and create a more streamlined military operation in Vietnam.

Continuous and heavy air and sea attacks against staging areas, supply routes, training fields, camps and recuperation centers of the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam and Laos will be necessary for any appreciable diminution in the flow of men and supplies to the Communists. The one-shot retaliatory raids have only temporary and minimum military importance; viewed as political and psychological warnings, they are likely to provoke the Vietcong and North Vietnam to a redoubled war effort.

How many United States soldiers would be needed is uncertain—probably a minimum of three to six divisions (utilized

chiefly in battalion or brigade-size units), possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy and supporting units perhaps 200,000 to 1,000,000 Americans would be fighting in Vietnam.

Obviously, this would mean a Korean-type conflict, a major war, no matter what euphemisms would be used. Nor could we wage

it in the present "business-as-usual" economy. We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed-up military production. Many weaknesses in our military structure would need strengthening. Even so, we could not anticipate quick success.

No one could relish such a prospect as this; the stark statistics of war explain the Presi-

dent's reluctance to embark upon a path that has no turning.

Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the struggle for freedom; there is no "good" place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.

Our Position: 'Hopeless Romantics' Look To War

(Continued from Page S1)

us of the parallel of the Nazi destruction of Lidice. No slogan of non-appeasement can bar the consideration of the concrete picture involved.

Value of Peace

It is asked whether we should take peace at any price. Does the end justify the means? Of course not. But the value of peace in the nuclear age is high, and the case against it must be proven beyond any doubt, not a set of unanalyzed assumptions and traditional reactions of another age. It is perhaps more appropriate in the light of what we have permitted to ask whether victory is sought at any price. The war has been waged against the Viet Cong with napalm bombs, defoliation, the herding of peasants into concentration camp-like villages, and the setting of vast forest fires. What means will we stop at?

It is said that the bombing of North Vietnam is intended to compel negotiation and so presumably be a blessing in disguise. But what has been the effect of this escalation, and what is its character? In a trenchant critique in the *Herald Tribune* of March 18, 1965, Walter Lippmann pointed out that the policy assumes we can find a measured bombing point which will not be so strong as to produce a wider war but strong enough to compel Hanoi to give up. But, he adds, it is not working: "In fact the military situation has never been so bad as it is now." He states bluntly, "the Viet Cong is winning the war, and the time may not be far off when a coup in Saigon will bring forth a government which will make peace with the Viet Cong and with Hanoi." What, he asks, do we offer them if the war ended our way, what sort of future may they expect. The answer to Lippmann's question so far seems to be only a continuation of a military dictatorship.

Johnson's Fallacy

And what of the terms that accompany our bombing North Vietnam? Senator Morse in a speech reported in the Congressional Record (March 11, 1965, p. 4759) says: "One of the most inexcusable fallacies of the Johnson administration is its constant reference to the statement 'We will not negotiate until North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone.' In other words, we will not negotiate except on our terms, and we are a little bit amiss when we find that North Vietnam and others take a similar closed-mind position." Senator Morse speaks of the "fallacious paper known as the white paper," and says: "The American people are being asked to swallow the propaganda that if we do not make war, all of Asia will fall to the

Red Chinese." He flatly asserts that the top spokesmen of the State Department repudiated the domino theory—that if Vietnam falls all Southeast Asia will fall—before the Committee on Foreign Relations within recent weeks, and challenges Dean Rusk to deny it in public. Morse has stated many of the central issues repeatedly—and in advance. In a speech on "The Crisis in Vietnam" at a Joint University Forum in Chicago on January 15, 1965, he warned that "If we expand the war into Laos, North Vietnam, or China, in the name of protecting our investment in South Vietnam, it will be an outright American aggrandizement of the kind we have not embarked upon since the Mexican War. We will not only be inviting disaster but will be flouting every principle of international policy we have espoused since World War II." And again, "There never has been a time since 1954 when it was possible for this country to impose a government upon the people of South Vietnam without constant fighting to keep it in power. The war there will never end on our terms because our very presence and our domination of its affairs is a target for rebellion."

Baldwin Criticized

In the light of such analysis, Baldwin's peroration, "it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers," is the very opposite of the probable picture. Fighting in Vietnam will render all sorts of other fighting much more likely. To make peace in Vietnam is the way to avoid fighting in Hawaii.

A point-for-point confrontation with specific justifications is, however, not enough. We must go further, and ask what presuppositions would make some sense of our Vietnam policy. Hanson Baldwin pinpoints these prenam, we are attempting to for-suppositions succinctly: "In Vietnamulate an answer to the Communist strategy of creeping aggression, of subversion and insurgency, of what Khrushchev called 'wars of national liberation.' If the might and will of the United States cannot evolve a victorious answer to such tactics, we are undone; the map of the world will gradually become red." It is as simple as all that—there is a world war going on between us and Communism.

To be told that there is a world war going on and that there is our side and their side is not very enlightening. We want to know—especially in the light of the high cost of war—whether the war is avoidable or unavoidable, and most important, what it is about. The constantly reiterated phrase, "to defend our

way of life." Keeps its force by being unanalyzed. Are we being called on to defend civil liberties, democratic equality, foreign investments, or American capitalism? It makes a great deal of difference, and it has not been shown that we have here a single take-it-or-leave-it bundle. And how or which of these are threatened by negotiating some compromise in Vietnam, or even by a complete Viet Cong take-over? The conventional view that every pinker shade on the map is a mortal blow begs all the important questions on which life and death now depend. I am not ignoring either conspiracy or the genuine conflicts of social systems. There is no doubt conspiracy enough on all sides—in our case the CIA acting in a quite James Bondian fashion, as recent sugary revelations have shown. And there are certainly different social systems among which an emerging nation can choose, though perhaps they are more numerous and shade more imperceptibly than the stark opposition of capitalism and communism may suggest. But significantly enough, the emerging nations and the so-called uncommitted nations have generally refused to structure the present problems of the world as capitalism vs. communism. They see the war as one against misery and poverty, and for lifting men everywhere through industrial development and education and self-government to greater material and cultural heights. If we are being told to regard every movement for national liberation or for land reform or for national take-over of foreign industries as a Communist conspiracy calling for our intervention, we are being asked to assume the mantle of reaction.

Anti-Communist Crusade

To take up this anti-Communist crusade thesis as the central problem of our time and risk our lives on it is intransigent sacrifice of the world's real problems for a speculative theory. It is not realism. It is to go back on the hard-won lessons of the last decade. Russia gradually abandoned the remarkably similar Stalinist thesis of inevitable war with the capitalist powers for the effort at coexistence to avoid nuclear destruction. China attacks Russia for such "appeasement." Are we now being asked to make the basis of our immediate and deadly decision the older Stalinist thesis, to side in this respect with China against Russia?

Another lesson of the last decade must not be forgotten. We can no longer even think in simple terms of the Western side or of Communism. We have seen the break-up of blocs, the growing variety and independence within

Students interested in participating in the demonstration against the war in Vietnam in Washington on April 17, Easter Saturday, should leave a deposit in Room 412 Finley or the OP office. Fare is six dollars. The rally will be addressed by Senator Gruening (Dem-Alaska), M. S. Arnoni, the editor of the *Minority of One*

Communism of Yugoslavia and Poland and Rumania. There is no reason to expect less variety in Asia even if a number of its countries choose the communist way. It is time to be more far-sighted and less hysterical. The future does not stand or fall—nor should it be made to fall—by what happens to the social system of Vietnam. Nor should the fear of Peking domination drive us into disastrous war.

Defense Against Domination

Even if Peking hungers after the nations of Southeast Asia, we can be reasonably confident that they will develop their own peculiar brands of indigestibility, as the nations of Eastern Europe have done. George Kennan, whose experience in the revisionist communist nations has been an extensive one, has suggested that if we worried less about protecting the nations in the southern crescent they would probably develop more readily their own resources against being dominated.

Surely it is clear by this stage in contemporary history that no one country, no one social system, can hope to dominate the globe, that people everywhere should be left free to experiment on what social arrangements suit them best, that competition between systems must take peaceful forms, that modes of international cooperation achieved with such difficulty should be strengthened not torn to pieces. If this sounds idealistic, it is nonetheless the most practical path. The most hopeless romantics of the modern world—though there is nothing "romantic" about them—are those who believe that war now settles anything; they are dreaming of the 18th century, not living in the 20th. Increasingly, it is the long-range view that becomes the most practical. In our own life-time in America we have seen social policies that were argued as bitterly as communism—for example, social security three decades ago—become accepted commonplaces. We know that human life on the globe fifty years hence will have been overwhelmingly transformed. We cannot specify the shape nor spell out all its directions. But there is probably no cherished institution that will remain as it is. There is no present political program that now schematizes the progress adequately. The realities of the present human upsurge on the globe and the possibilities of vast progress will break through all tidy opposites. Men can take a genuine part in shaping their future if they will turn their energies toward its problems and not toward battling over present limitations. But this makes it morally mandatory to break through to peace. There is no human dignity, no future in the cinder-heap.

Selma . . .

(Continued from Page 1)
 Mike Kinsler, Evening Session SG President, discussed the role of Negro high school and college students in the South. "The youth there is really in the vanguard. They are moving quickly in the South," he said. Kinsler added that he learned a lot from the students he met in Montgomery. Howard Simon, former Educational Affair Vice-President, said he had gone to Selma "to see what white people were like in the South, and to find out if

there were any 'moderate' white people in Selma." Simon told the audience that he did not meet any, and added that the only safe place in Selma was the section in the city in which the Negro community is located. A moderate group in Montgomery, the concerned White Citizens, didn't get much publicity and disbanded, he said. Paul Hirsch, Campus Affairs Vice-President, spoke about the need for more Northerners to participate in the fight for civil rights. "There is a reciprocal relationship involved here," he

said. "A Northerner can become a better person by going to Selma."
Exec . . .
 (Continued from Page 1)
 authorized expenditure of funds. The vote was deadlocked, 2-2-1, when presiding officer Joel Cooper exercised his right to break the tie and voted no. The bill was introduced by councilman Carl Weitzman after OP's Managing Board prepared a special issue supporting the proposed boycott. The issue had to be scrapped when

Council substituted a rally for the boycott.
B'klyn . . .
 (Continued from Page 1)
 lations were imposed by Faculty and Faculty-Student Committees. He claimed that he was merely implementing the rules made by the faculty.
Queens . . .
 (Continued from Page 8)
 going to lose this game. Martin led off the eighth inning by drawing a walk off starter and loser Ron Filenti. Dave Hayes, running for Martin, moved into scoring position by stealing second. After making Filenti work a little,

Beaver second sacker Barry Edelstein jumped on a ball that was low and away and ripped it to right field sending Hayes home with the go ahead run. After Barry Mandel reached base safely on an error, Matruzo came up to hit for Meyreles. With two strikes on him, the six foot sophomore ripped a shot over the head of the Queens left fielder and circled the bases for the first Lavender round-tripper of the 1965 campaign. Joel Weinberger came on in relief but in turn was relieved by Howie Smith, who saved the first big win of the season. The Beavers will next see action this coming Saturday at St. John's in their first league contest of the season.



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Diamondsmen Split First Two Contests

Mastruzzo's Hit Tops Queens

Barry Edelstein got his first hit of the year and knocked in the go ahead run as the College's baseball team knocked off Queens College, 6-3, at NYU's Ohio Field yesterday. The clinching runs were batted in by pinch-hitter Ralph Mastruzzo as he blasted a three run inside-the-park homer in the eighth inning.

Mastruzzo was batting for the starting and winning pitcher, Roland Meyreles. Rollie went seven good innings before being lifted for a pinch hitter. The big right-hander gave Queens only two earned runs.



Coach Sol Mishkin (left) was cheered by the Baseballers 6-3 victory over Queens. The win was saved by Howie Smith (right), the losing pitcher against Columbia.



third, but scored as Lou Henik came through with a sacrifice fly to left.

Bernie Martin knocked in the second Beaver run of the afternoon with a double in the fifth. Queens tied the score in their half of the fifth frame on a walk and back to back singles. They

took the lead in the sixth inning when Roger Braverman lead off with a single, stole second and later scored as he knocked the ball out of catcher Bernie Martin's glove with a hard slide into home.

But the Lavender were not (Continued on Page 7)

First Victory

CCNY	001	010	040	571
Queens	100	011	090	395

The Lavender scored its first run in the third inning. With Queens leading 1-0 by virtue of a first inning tally, Beaver left fielder Bill Miller ripped a tremendous drive to deep left field. The shot was easily over 320 feet but there is no fence at Ohio Field for another hundred feet or so. Miller tripped rounding first base and could only make it to

Netmen Upset Panthers, 6-3, Snapping Adelphi Win Skein

The College's tennis team scored one of the biggest upsets of the entire year as far as Beaver athletics is concerned when it stopped the 32 game Met League winning streak of Adelphi by beating the Panthers 6-3.

The match, played on the Fin-

ley courts, for also the coaching debut of Lavender tennis mentor Robert Cire.

The Beaver netmen showed a great deal of depth as the Panthers won the number one and two matches in the singles competition.

Elliot Simon, number three man for the Beavers turned out to be the number one thorn in the side of Adelphi as he not only won his singles match but teamed up with Pete Schaffer to beat the Panthers' Pablo Pick and Joe Schwalb in the longest match of the day, over two hours.

The Panthers' number one man, Barry Certner, who also stars for Adelphi on the basketball court, won two matches in both singles and doubles competition.

Early Deficit

Certner put Adelphi out in front by beating Marty Deitch 6-3, 6-4. Adelphi pushed their lead to 2-0 as Pablo Pick knocked off Charles Mattes. But then the Lavender came back. Simon beat Jerry Kaye. Mike Seiden came from behind to beat Neal Jablon 1-6, 6-3, 6-3.

Arnie Garfin put the Beavers out in front by sinking Ed Paines 6-4, 6-4 with a fantastic "lob" shot. Joel Litlow gave the Beavers their fourth straight singles victory by beating Schwalb 6-1, 6-3.

After Certner and Paines won for Adelphi and Simon and Schaffer for the Lavender in the first two doubles matches, Charlie Mattes and Pete Willmann teamed to beat Jablon and Kaye 6-2, 3-6, 6-4 for the clincher.

Last season against Adelphi, the Lavender dropped a 9-0 decision.

Saturday the team looked good, especially for its first outing and should improve as the season progresses.

—Jaffe

Beavers Get Only Four Hits; Roberts Knocks 3 For Lions

By HARVEY WEINBERG

They say that baseball is 90 per cent pitching but the idea of the game is still to outscore your opponent. That other 10 per cent, hitting, just wasn't there for the College's baseball team Saturday as they were blanked 4-0 on four hits by Columbia at blustery Baker Field.

In addition, Lavender starting pitcher Howie Smith didn't really chip in with his full 90 per cent. When you toss in a few strategically placed Beaver errors, some equally potent Lion double plays along with the fourth pitching of Lion lefty Dave Hillis you have the ingredients of a Lavender loss in their initial game of the 1965 season.

Howie Smith wasn't as sharp as he usually is and the Lions jumped on him right in the first inning. Lead-off hitter Ron Adsit made Howie work and work hard before finally bouncing out.

The next batter, centerfielder Pete Quinn got a hold of one of Smitty's pitches and ripped a shot deep in the hole at short that had 'base-hit' labeled all over it. But the Beavers have one of the finest shortstops in the City patrolling the area between second and third. Sophomore Barry Mandel went far to his right, speared the ball backhanded and fired a bullet to first to nail Quinn.

In retrospect this was a key play. The next batter, former Lion football star Archie Roberts, laid a perfect bunt down the third base line that was the beginning of a two-out, two run rally for the Light Blue.

Neil Farber followed with a walk and when Steve Richman singled to right, the Lions had their first run and runners at first and third.

On the first pitch to Reg Matton, Richman broke for second. Beaver catcher Bernie Martin made a nice bluff toward second and had Farber picked off third. But when his peg went into left field, the Lions had their second run of the inning.

After issuing his second walk of the first frame, Smith finally got out of it by getting Gene Chwerchek to ground out. Mandel's clutch play at short was a big reason the Lions only got

two. The Beavers had a rally going in the third. Mandel led off and reached first safely when centerfielder Quinn dropped his fly ball. With one out, Bill Miller lined the first of his two singles and the Beavers had runners on first and second.

But the threat died as Barry Edelstein bounced into a double-play.

The Lavender again had runners on first and second in the fifth with only one away. But after Smith had sacrificed the runners up a base, Hillis reared back and fanned Bill Miller.

In their half of the fifth, the Lions added a run to their lead. With one away, Roberts singled for his third straight hit. Neil

Beavers Blanked

CCNY (0)		Columbia (4)	
	ABR H		ABR H
Miller cf	4 0 2	Adsit 2b	5 0 0
Edelstein 3b	3 0 0	Quinn cf	4 0 0
Minkoff 3b	3 0 0	Roberts ss	4 2 3
Martin c	4 0 0	Farber rf	1 1 1
Gatti lb	4 0 1	Richman 3b	4 0 1
Beccalori lf	3 0 0	Matton lf	2 1 1
Henik rf	3 0 0	Schwerchek lb	3 0 2
Mandel ss	3 0 1	Peter c	3 0 1
Smith p	1 0 3	Hillis p	4 0 0
Schneider ph	1 0 0		
Totals	29 0 4	Totals	30 4 9
CCNY	000 000	Columbia	000-0
Columbia	200 010		01x-4

RBI—Richman, E. — CCNY 3, Columbia 2, PO-A CCNY 24-14, Columbia 27-13. DP—CCNY (Mandel-Gatti), Columbia 2 (Roberts-Adsit-Chwerchak) (Hillis-Roberts-Chwerchak) LOB — CCNY 6, Columbia 7. SB — Barber S — Smith, Farber, Peters.

Pitching		IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO
Hillis W (1)		9	4	0	0	3	8
Smith L (0-1)		7	8	3	1	4	2
Weinberger		1	1	1	1	1	0
Hime: 2:31	WP — Smith.						

Farber bunted to move Roberts on to second, and when Howie Smith's throw went wild, the Lions had runners at the corners with one out. Their third run of the day crossed the plate when Roberts scored on a force out.

The last Beaver threat came in the eighth. But it was the same story. With Beavers on first and second and one out, Hillis got Dave Minkoff to bounce one right back to the mound. He fired to Roberts at second for one and then on to Chwerchak at first for the twin killing.

Montclair Defeats Tracksters; Bob Bogart Leads Lavender

The College's track and field team met defeat in a close meet with Montclair State College on Saturday at Montclair. After a discrepancy in the scoring was corrected the final score was determined as 75 to 65 in favor of Montclair. The tracksters fell prey to a lack of depth and weakness in the weight events — shot put and discus throw.

In the running events, the tracksters emerged victorious by a score of 50 to 27. Bob Bogart and Jim O'Connell paced the team with their performances. Bogart had 17 points (tops for the Beavers) in winning the intermediate hurdles and high jump, and in scoring in the high hurdles,

broad jump, and pole vault. O'Connell won the mile and the two mile events with times of 4:42 and 9:51, respectively. The two mile mark is quite a bit off his 9:28 school indoor record, but O'Connell is expected to improve on this first outdoor trial.

The tracksters sorely missed the triple jump event, as it was one of their strong points. Montclair, being the home team, did not schedule the event for the meet.

The team had other bright spots, however, when Don Schlesinger won the 100 yard dash in 10.7 seconds and Marcel Sierra won the 880 yard run in two minutes and 11 seconds.

Stickmen Beaten By Wildcats Performance Satisfies Baron

Losing to New Hampshire, 9-6, last Saturday at Lewisohn Stadium was not all disappointing to the College's lacrosse team. As a matter of fact, Coach George Baron said that he expects his team to split even for the season if their play continues on the same caliber.

The Beavers put up a good fight, and they were in the game until the final two minutes. The Beavers actually led during most



Coach George Baron Satisfied By Performance

of the first half, and at one point led by two points, 4-2. However by half-time, New Hampshire took the lead, 5-4.

In the second half, the Wildcats stretched their lead to three, 7-4. The Beavers made it close again, by narrowing their deficit to one goal.

With 2:30 remaining in the game, the score remained at 7-6. At that point the Beavers had a

one man advantage because of a penalty against New Hampshire.

The Beaver attackmen tried to launch several offenses but were unsuccessful. The Lavender's lack of success was in a large part due to the tremendous efforts of the Wildcats' goalie Jeff Poole. Poole was given honorable mention in last year's All-America selections.

The Beavers then made a couple of mistakes, mainly due to their lack of experience, and New Hampshire scored their final two goals to make the score 9-6.

Leading the Beaver attack was Ted Kostiuk with three goals and one assist. According to Baron, Craig Hirsch played the finest game of his playing career. Although he only scored one goal, he played a great all around game.

What pleased Baron the most about his team's play was that his players exercised good control and they had a wonderful spirit — they never give up.

Stan Nack was goalie for the Lavender and he played a good game. He made a few mistakes that cost a couple of goals but they were only due to his inexperience. With time he should become a good minder of the Beavers' net.

This week the Beavers will be facing their toughest competition of the year. On Wednesday, the Lavender play C. W. Post, and on Saturday the Beavers meet Adelphi. Both games will be played in Lewisohn Stadium.

Last year the Lavender were defeated by Post and Adelphi 14-4 and 10-5, respectively.